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"A Piece of the Pie;" 
An Oral History of the Union Movement at 
The Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
by 
Mindy K. Small 
Abstract 
In 1936 the Committee for Industrial Organization and the 
Steel Workers Organizing Committee began a campaign to organize the 
nation's steel workers around an independent union based on indus- 
trial lines.  From the outset, these two groups faced a traditionally 
tough and formidable adversary.  The American steel industry, 
throughout its history, had maintained a nollcy of anti-unionism 
and pained a refutation as staunch defenders of the open shop 
principle.  However, during the 1930's, new circumstances arose 
which threatened the steel industry's ability to sustain this 
position indefinitely and insured the eventual success of the 
union drive. 
The 1930's created a ripe atmosphere for labor to demand 
their share of rights and privileges under the lav/.  As a result of 
the Great Depression, labor gained a new and influential ally in the 
federal government.  In particular, the Wagner Act legitimized unions 
and made labor's right to collective bargaining a matter of public 
policy.  Thus, pro-unionists received a legal basis of support which 
proved vital to the successful implementation of their obiectives. 
From the start, union leaders allocated a considerable 
amount of time and effort to organizing the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation.  This firm, the largest and most powerful of the 
independent steel producers, represented a nrime target for union 
agitation.  In 1941, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, con- 
centrated an entire phase of their drive around the companv's main 
plant at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  In doing so, they took on a 
decisive challenge due, in part, to Bethlehem's staunch opposition 
to unionism.  Their activities culminated in a four day strike 
which ended in victory for the union.  As a result of Bethlehem's 
concession, the remaining unorganized producers also signed union 
contracts. 
The organizing drive at Bethlehem forced manv steel 
workers to decide what their personal role in the union struggle 
would be.  Their attitudes tot^ard the company, the union and their 
daily working experiences affected their decisions tremendously. 
Those that supported the union did so for various reasons, however, 
their primary purpose was to gain security, protection, and better 
and safer working conditions.  Moreover, many workers joined the 
union because they believed that the best way to achieve these roals 
was through collective action represented by an independent union. 
'Introduction 
Since its emergence after the Civil War, the American 
steel industry maintained a lone-established tradition of ar.ti- 
unionism and a reputation as staunch defenders of the open shop 
principle.  After defeating a major attemnt by labor, in 1919, to 
reverse this position, the industry remained unorganized and 
relatively free from labor strife and disturbances throughout the 
1920's.  However, in a little more than a decade the whole course 
of labor relations in the steel industry was drastically altered. 
By 1941, the United Steel Workers of America, an independent union 
based on industrial lines, represented the nation's steel workers 
as their exclusive bargaining agent throughout the entire industry. 
A number of related factors and conditions produced this profound 
change. 
For the most oart, the events surrounding the decade of 
the 1930's had stimulated a renewed interest in unionism among 
labor leaders, union organizations and individual workers themselves, 
The major impetus behind this activity resulted from the economic 
depression and the effects it had on the American working classes 
in general.  Eventually, this interest grew into a full scale 
labor movement as workers found it increasingly necessary to create 
a line of defense against the fluctuations in the business cycle. 
3 
An organization to secure and protect their rights, repardless of 
the prevailing economic or political situation, seemed the only 
alternative to their dilemma.  The need and./or demand for 
unionization was not new or original.  Previous hard times and 
bad conditions had- produced similar reactions from labor, however, 
their attempts at unionization usually ended in failure.  What 
specific circumstances insured the eventual success of this par- 
ticular movement and were thev uninue in this period in American 
labor history? 
Basically, the 1930's set the stage and created a ripe 
atmosphere for labor to demand their equal share of rights and 
privileges under the law.  As a result of the severity of the 
depression, the nation and the public were ax-mkened to the plight 
of labor in an industrialized society and thus, began baching 
worker demands for organization.  But more important, labor found 
a new and influential ally in the federal government.  The pro- 
labor posture of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal legislation, 
particularly the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Waener 
Act, aided labor's cause tremendously. Moreover, this legislation 
helped insure the ultimate success of the union campaign.  These 
Acts legitimized unions and made labor's right to collective bar- 
gaining a matter of public policy.  Without this specific Vind of 
aid and support, the union movement of the 1930's might have gone 
the \\*ay of other ones before it.  However, this time labor gained a 
A 
legal basis of-backing which• proved vital to the successful imple- 
mentation of their objectives.  Thus, labor could forpe ahead in 
the process of unionizing the nation's mass production industries, 
and in particular, the steel industry. 
Moreover, the creation of the Committee for Industrial 
Organization, in 1936, supplied the workers with an organization 
dedicated to their cause.  The CIO set out to organize America's 
mass production workers into independent unions based on industrial 
lines.  Within the scope of trade unionism, this particular concept 
of organization increased in popularity.  Before the depression, most 
unionized workers were skilled tradesmen.  This left out the large 
and still growing number of unskilled and semi-skilled workers em- 
ployed by the major industries.  It was this later group which the 
CIO hoped to influence and ultimately organize.  Thus, with this 
objective in mind, the nation's steel producers became a prime area 
of interest and concern to the CIO.  The eventual unionization of 
this industry represented a decisive challenge to all those involved 
and required a considerable amount of time, money and effort.  Al- 
though labor had the sunport of the federal government and a majoritv 
of the public behind them, the road ahead was difficult because of 
the power and influence of the American steel industry itself. 
In order to meet the challenge, the CIO established the 
Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1936.  Immediately, they began 
to pursue the objectives expressed above and worked to reverse the 
industry's conventional policies and position.  Quite unexpectedly, 
5 
the. steel union met with an important success rather earlv on in 
their drive.  In 1937, United States Steel, known as Bit* Steel, 
signed a contract with the union, making them the first American 
steel producer to surrender under the union's pressure.  This 
agreement proved decisive because it broke the industry's traditional 
united ^ront against unionism. 
The next phase of the union's campaign was much more 
difficult and time consuming.  The nation's large independent 
steel producers, known collectively as Little Steel, refused to 
follow the lead of Big Steel.  This group of industrialists 
banded together in their anti-union fipht and thus, managed to 
hold off the advance of unionism for a few more years.  Although 
their efforts were aimed at defeating the 1936 union drive in steel, 
they failed to develop and implement a strategy strong enough to 
stem the tide of unionism altogether. 
Basically, the U.S. Steel settlement represented one 
more step in the process which caused the inevitable breakdown of 
steel's resistance to unionism.  The depression and the resultant 
pressures brought on by government legislation, the CIO and SVOC, 
and the public made the triumph of unionism only a matter of time. 
Throughout the 1930's, the steel industry found it increasinely 
necessary to yield, at least in part, to labor's demands.  Many 
steel producers developed and implemented a number of different 
employee related programs and plans to create a more contented work- 
force and to quell the renewed demand for outside unionism.  Their 
6 
efforts included welfare programs, stock subscrlntior plans, and 
emnlovee representation plans—everything "short of actual unionism. 
Thus, when a specific company or the industr-" in general bad de- 
pleted the number of alternative nropraiis it was willinr to offer 
and when the plans had run their course, the only logical step to 
insure industrial peace seemed to be the recognition of independent 
unions.  Little Steel held out for a while, but, as the decade 
progressed, new events and circumstances, specifically the fear of 
war and the resultant rearmament program, adversely affected their 
ultimate objectives.  Thus, the industrv became more and more 
vulnerable to the threat of unionism as time wore on. 
Since their inception, the Steel Workers Organizing 
Committee allocated a considerable amount of time and effort to 
organizing the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.  However, in 1941, 
they specifically concentrated an entire phase of their drive and 
centered all their activities around the companv's main plant 
located in Bethlehem, Pennsvlvania.  This firm, beinp- the largest 
of the independent producers and one of the most powerful within 
the Little Steel group, represented a prime target for union 
agitation.  The union's leaders analvzed the prevailing situation 
carefully and concluded that if Bethlehem conceded, the rest of 
Little Steel would follow shortly thereafter. 
This thesis deals primarily with the circumstances 
leading UP to and the actual events surrounding the union's campaign 
against Bethlehem Steel.  The rise and decline of Bethlehem's 
company union or Employee Representation Plan reflected the actual 
7 
trends that developed on a national scale which directly influenced 
the course of the lahor movement.  The company union played a 
significant role during the period between the two major labor 
struge-les (1919-1936) in the steel industry.  At Bethlehem, the 
company union managed to survive from its incention during World 
I'ar I until the union's challenge in 1941.  Throughout the 1930Ts, 
however, doubt and criticism regarding its relevance and effective- 
ness increased and eventually contributed, in oart, to its demise. 
Thus, the depression, the CIO and the federal government had taken 
their toll. 
This thesis is a case studv of the grievances and needs 
of Bethlehem's labor force which ultimately led the workers to 
struggle for unionization.  Revealing the motivations and events 
at Bethlehem can serve to broaden our understanding of the union 
drive elsewhere.  The conditions and attitudes which forced many 
individual steel workers across the nation to actively fight for 
union recognition transcended the physical boundaries of a 
particular plant or company.  For the most part, working conditions, 
wages and hours varied slightly throughout the industry as a whole. 
However, each individual steel worker reacted to his own set of 
experiences and opinions before he eventually decided what form 
his future role in the labor movement would tate. 
Retired employees of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
narticioated in tane recorded interviews, either individually or in 
a group, which helped clarify and document the actual events and 
8 
effects of the union's organizing drive there.  All those inter- 
viewed worVed at the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania plant hefore the de- 
pression or bepan working there in the years 1930-1945, coincidinp 
with the second major attempt and eventual success at organizing 
Bethlehem Steel.  Their recollections and accounts gave a personal 
flavor to the story.  But more important, they explained their own 
individual experiences resulting from this significant period in 
American labor historv which directly touched their lives in almost 
every way.  The stories they recounted involved their particular 
roles in the actual events that ensued at the firm. 
The interviews specifically used in this paper came from 
a sample chosen by the author. Out of a total of forty-five re- 
searched tanes, onlv twenty-two were used. por the most part, the 
interviews incorporated in this paper were the ones that best 
expressed all or most of the aspects concerning the union question 
as it related to Bethlehem Steel and the individual subjects them- 
selves. 
The inquiry included tonics regarding the individual's 
personal employment history at the company: his attitude toward 
and relationship with the company, his fellow workers, foremen and 
supervisors, and his actual on the job experiences.  Questions also 
centered on the person's attitude toward work in general and the 
benefits or disadvantages therein, and life-time goals and ambitions. 
In addition, discussions revolved around the workers job description, 
pride in work accomplished and desire for advancement.  Moreover, the 
oarticioants explained t^eir feelings and attitudes about the union 
nuestion ard unionism in general.  ^rom there, they recalled nersonal 
experiences relative to the organizing drive that occurred there. 
There was considerable variation among the group in job 
experiences and -job stability.  Some advanced to higher positions 
as foreman or supervisors before their retirement.  Others had 
similar opportunities but turned them down because they refused to 
accept the responsibility.  The assortment of positions or jobs held 
included bricklayer, roller, scrubber, fireman, machinist, car 
repairman, watchman, craneman, rivetheater, smelter, and welder. 
As their jobs varied, so did the departments in which 
they worked, the ethnic and religious composition of their fellow 
workers, the personalities of their narticular foreman and their 
attitudes toward work in general.  All these factors influenced 
and helped shape their opinions toward the union itself. 
Singularly, these accounts merely state the recollections 
or personal histories of individual steel workers concerning their 
daily experiences and relationship with>Bethlehem Steel at a 
particular neriod of time.  Collectively, however, they form part of 
the history surrounding the actual unionization of Bethlehem; itself 
being only a part of the national drive to organize the entire basic 
steel industry in America. 
All those interviewed recalled the drive for union 
recognition.  Their roles ranged from striker to "scab," organizer 
to non-participant, but all felt the effects of the union question 
10 
in their daily, encounters.  However, manv workers tooh advantage n^ 
the prevailing situation, joined the steel union and activelv fought 
f




Throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century, 
the American steel industry remained a staunch nrononent of anti- 
unionism and the open shop; a position easily maintained with the 
existence of a largely unorganized labor force in steel.  T.-Tith the 
crushing defeat of unionism in the steel strike of 1919, virtually 
all attemnts to organize the industry came to a grinding halt.  How- 
ever, the occurrence of certain historical factors and conditions 
forced the industry to reverse its long standing position. 
The events surrounding the decade of the 1930's drasti- 
cally altered the course of American labor history.  Although the 
economic crisis took its toll on all segments of society, its 
effects on industrial labor were profound.  During the depression, 
the nation experienced massive unemplovment, hunger, insecurity and 
other extreme hardships.  These severe conditions fostered new fears 
and anxieties among the working classes, or at least intensified the 
old ones. 
By the second half of the decade, the economy had im- 
proved considerably.  Industry faced a new wave of consumer demand 
and a rise in production followed.  This resulted in an increase in 
the number of available jobs.  These factors helped the country 
recover from its physical and economic wounds.  However, the impact 
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of the depression left deep emotional scars on the lives of nanv 
individual workers and their families—an imprint that proved 
difficult to erase. 
For many laborers, the depression created a greater 
awareness of their economic problems and stimulated a renewed 
interest in unionism.  Labor had to establish a line of defense 
in the event of future depressions and arainst the normal uns and 
downs brought on by the erratic nature of  the economy.  An inde- 
pendent union, free from the controls of business and management, 
would advance the cause of labor, secure the rights and privileges 
they demanded, and provide the protection and security they needed. 
In short, they wanted an organization that would work solely in 
their behalf and represent their wishes whenever necessary. 
These goals and ideas were not new or original. However, 
the circumstances that aroused a revival of interest in them were 
unique. The historical factors and events of the 1930's heightened 
the desirability and necessity of unionism. In addition to the de- 
pression, two powerful forces contributed in creating a ripe 
atmosphere for the advance of labor: the federal government and the 
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). 
The federal government influenced the renewed trend toward 
unionism and provided an important impetus to the growth of a new 
labor movement.  The pro-labor stance of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the legislation enacted by the New Deal marked the changing attitude 
of the federal government toward the rights of labor and helped 
foster a new awareness within society.  Public opinion began supporting 
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labor's demands as the nation increasingly realized the necessity for 
organizing the unskilled worker.  Under the New Deal, the United 
States Government, for the first time, had a national labor nolicv 
that favored the workingman.  In particular, labor's right to 
collective bargaining was legitimized and made a matter of nublic 
nolicv:  first, through the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA), and later, through the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), more commonly referred to as the Wagner Act. 
The NIRA guaranteed something for both business and labor. 
Business could draft code agreements exempt from the anti-trust 
laws and labor received Section 7(a) which guaranteed them the right 
1 
to collective bargaining.   Moreover, the codes had to set minimum 
wages and maximum hours.  Roosevelt created a series of labor boards 
to maintain industrial neace and give some substance to 7(a).   Later, 
the boards formulated a rough body of labor laws.  Basically, the 
NIRA allowed workers to decide through elections the kind of 
representation they desired—a nationally affiliated union, a company 
union or no union at all.  Also, any union chosen by a majority of 
the workers would have exclusive bargaining rights for all workers. 
Thus, if the company union only represented a minority of the em- 
Filliam E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
New Deal (New York: Harner and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 57- 
58. 
2Ibid., p. 107. 
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plovees, it would virtually be outlawed.  The board insisted that • 
Section 7(a) remiired employers to bargain with unions in ?ood   faith, 
3 
and that bargaining must lead to some sort of an agrfrginer^t.   How- 
ever, on May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous 9-0 de- 
cision, found the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional. 
Then on July 5, 1935, Roosevelt signed one of the most im- 
portant legislative documents of the period, the National Labor 
4 
Relations Act.   The Act started from the same premise as Section 
7(a) of the NIRA—that is, that workers should be free to choose 
their own unions and employers must abstain from interfering in 
their choice. 
Employees shall have the right of self-oreaniza- 
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities, for the purpose of collective bargain- 
ing or other mutual aid or protection.  5 
The NLRA also required ^that employers accept duly constituted unions 
as legitimate representatives of their employees and bargain with 
them.  Basically, it compelled employers to move toward the unioniza- 
tion of their plants.  The act listed five unfair labor practices 
which only an employer could commit.  The Wagner Act did not impose 
3Ibid. 
4 
Ibid., p. 151. 
Henry Steel Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 
The National Labor Relations Act, Vol. II, (New York: Appleton- 
Century-Crafts, 1968), p. 315. 
15 
6 
anv reciprocal obligations on unions.   The court? alrradv had a 
number of laws concerning unfair labor practices by unions and it 
7 
was not considered necessary to add to them in the Act. 
In addition, the Wagner Act provided for a National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB); a permanent independent agency emnowered 
to supervise and conduct elections to determine the desired bar- 
gaining agent of a majority of workers in a plant, to restrain 
business from committing unfair labor practices, and to hold hearings 
based on the former from complaints filed by employees or labor 
organizations themselves.  Thus, by establishing the NLRB, the Act 
provided the machinery for its own enforcement.  In 1937, the 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling, upheld the rights of labor when it 
found the Wagner Act constitutional. 
The legislation enacted under the Mew Deal gave labor 
something thev never enjoyed before—a le<»al basis of support to 
forge ahead in unionizing America's major industries.  In the end, 
this support laid the necessary foundations to insure a successful 
organizing campaign. Moreover, the pro-labor outlook of Roosevelt's 
Administration gave labor a psychological advantage and strengthened 
morale by rallying the support of public opinion behind its cause. 
The second powerful force contributing to the growth of a 
new labor movement came with the creation of the Committee for 
Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 151. 
Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past (New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 403. 
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Industrial Organi zntion.  The renewal attempts to organize tie steel 
industrv first developed out of a split within the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL) between those forces advocating craft unionism and 
those pushing for industrial unionism.  John L. Lewis, head of the 
United Mine Workers (UMW), led those strongly supporting the creation 
of a new international union based on industrial lines with complete 
iurisdiction over all workers.  Finally, in 1936, Lewis' efforts 
produced results.  After considerable controversy and debate among 
both factions within the AFL, the storm subsided with the establish- 
ment of the CIO under the leadership of John L. Lewis.  lewis later 
remarked: 
Out of the agony and travail of economic America 
the C.I.O. was born.  To millions of Americans, 
exploited without stint by corporate industry and 
socially debased beyond the understanding of the 
fortunate, its coming was as welcome as the dawn 
to the nigbtwatcher. ...  Tt is now and hence- 
forth a definite instrumentality destined greatly 
to influence the lives of our people and the in- 
ternal course of the Republic.  8 
Ultimately, Lewie' statement proved correct. 
The CIO made the organization of the steel industry one 
9 
of its prime targets.   Poor planning and lack of adeouate finances 
hampered previous attempts, in 1892 and 1919, at creating an 
10 
independent labor organization in the steel industry.    However, 
3 
"Labor," Time, 30, September 13, 1937, P. 11. 
9 
Walter Oalenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 79. 
William T. Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel 
Industry in the United States, Vol. Ill, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and 
Co., 1971), p. 1170. 
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the leaders involved in this new ort>nnizing drive benefited fror. the 
lessons learned from previous blunders and applied their knowledge 
to the task.  This time the powerful influence of the United Mine 
Workers stood behind the CIO's drive for steel unionization and 
11 
it devoted much of its resources to an organizational effort. 
For the massive undertaking of organizing the steel industry, millions 
of dollars, a considerable amount of time, and intense planning went 
into the effort.  Experienced and already nowerful and prominent 
labor leaders came to the fore to pursue the objective and conduct 
the drive.  Thus, the CIO created a confident and diligent atmos- 
phere that influenced the decisions of many individual steel workers 
to -join their ranks and to take active roles in the campaign to 
unionize the American steel industry.  Moreover, by 1937, the 
economy had imnroved considerably; a factor which not only aided 
industry and labor, but the organizing efforts of the CIO as well. 
This pro-labor atmosphere reinforced the beliefs of 
many steel workers across the country and encouraged them to stand 
firm in their convictions regarding the union question.  For the 
most part, this kind of contemplation helned them determine their 
future role in the advancing drive to organize the steel industry. 
Many steel workers took advantage of the situation, -joined the CIO, 
and became active unionists to gain for themselves, "a piece of the 
pie. 
11Ihid., p. 1169. 
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Chanter TT 
SWOC and Bir Steel 
The CIO's campaign to organize steel becan with thn 
creation of the Steel Workers Or^ani^inr» Committee (SWOC) , on June 
4, 1936, under the chairmanship of Philip Murray, vice-president of 
the United Mine Workers Union.  Other SWOC committee members in- 
cluded:  M.F. Tighe, Joseph Gaither and Thomas G. Gillis of the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers; Julius 
Hochman, vice-nresident of the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union; Leo Kryzycki of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; Van A. 
Bittner, David McDonald and P.F. Fa<tan of the ITMW; and John Brophv, 
also of the UMW and executive director of the CIO.  David McDonald 
became the secretary-treasurer of SWOC.  The union appointed 
Clinton S. Golden, one-time official of the NLRB, Rittner, nresident 
of the West Virginia miners' union, and William Mitch, district 
mine president of Alabama as northeastern, western and southern 
rep-ional directors respectively. 
John L. Lewis, who was responsible for SWOC's formation, 
remained apart from the union's hierarchy.  Instead, Lewis worked 
toward making himself a potent force in national labor politics. 
However, with Lewis' aid, the CIO set out, in 1936, to increase its 
1
"Labor," Time, 28, June 6, 1936, p. 17. 
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strength and prestige.  By that tine, the CIO represented a member- 
ship totaling 1,300,000.  However, the union honed to widen its base 
and boost its numbers by appealing to steel's one-half million 
workers.  Lewis remarked: 
This Is to be a campaign that has no termrfnal 
facilities, that has no deadline.  It is a fi^ht 
that is going to go on until the workers in the 
steel industry have the right to organize in 
unions of their own choice and decide conditions 
of their own working life in the same manner as 
workers in other industries.  2 
In planning their campaign, SW0C faced not only an industry 
that employed approximately 479,000 workers, but also an industry 
with a long standing reputation as the stronghold of the open shop 
in America.  Both employment and output were concentrated in lar^e 
steelworks and rolling mills.  United States Steel was by far the 
larcest employer with 220,000 workers; next came Bethlehem Steel, 
with 80,000; 49,000 worked for Republic Steel; and 29,000 at Jones 
3 
and Loughlin. 
To meet the challenge, a few hundred organizers from the 
CIO moved to the nation's steel centers to publicize SWOC, recruit 
new members and establish local lodges.  In addition, on August 1, 
1936, the union began publication of its own newspaper called Steel 
Labor. 
Both the CIO and SWOC hoped to stay within the law and 
2Ibid. 
3 
Galenson, CIO, Challenge to the AFL, p. 37. 
20 
avoid violence in their orctanizinp drive.  Lewis stated that the 
CTO's nurnose was "to conduct this campaign in a nerfectlv leoal 
manner. . . .  The Committee desires to avoid industrial strife and 
4 
disturbance or violence of anv charter."   But SWOC's actions de- 
pended upon the steel companies' reactions to the new campaign . 
aimed directly at their labor force.  To avoid a major controversv 
resulting in violence, SWOC needed a reasonable amount of 
cooperation from the steel employers.  However, SWOC maintained 
little confidence toward that end, evidenced by Lewis' statement: 
"If the steel industry insists on a fight we have no alternative 
but to meet them.  I should judge that thev would do just that 
5 
thing.  They always have." 
The steel industry, as exnected, opposed the new 
organizing attempt and responded by appealing to the public and 
the steel workers themselves.  In July, 1936, the American Iron 
and Steel Institute, representing ninety-five per cent of the 
nation's producers, took out a ^ull page advertisement in 375 
metropolitan newspapers, denouncing the idea of a closed shop and 
the overthrow of the employee representation plans.  Part of the 
ad read as follows: 
A campaign to unionize the emnloyes of the steel 
industrv has been announced. . . .  Persons and 
organizations not connected with the industrv 
"Labor," Time, 28, July 1.3, 1936, n. 11. 
3Ibid. 
have taken charge of the campaigns.  There 
are many disturbing indications that the pro- 
moters of the campaign will employ coercion 
and intimidation of the employes in the industry, 
and foment strikes. . . .  The steel industry 
will oppose any attempt to compel its enploves 
to -join a union or to pay tribute for the ripht 
to work. . . .6 
Thus, the American steel industry prepared itself for resisting 
the SWOC campaign and planned its strategy from there. 
However, the steel masters' plan of action for resistinp 
unionism, less wholehearted than before and the tactics reminiscent 
of those used in 1919, eventually rendered them ineffective.  ^art 
of their strategy included the immediate implementation of a 
propaganda campaign to discourage labor from being- swayed by the 
rhetoric of pro-union men and their leaders.  To begin with, they 
blamed the resurgence of unionism on communist and radical in- 
fluences within the CIO and accused the union's organizers of 
using scare tactics to intimidate and coerce workers into their 
ranks. Moreover, the employers intended to convince labor that the 
company union was an adequate mechanism to secure and protect their 
7 
rights. 
Ultimately, the industry's propaganda campaign was 
thwarted.  Public opinion was much more sympathetic to unions than 
it had been during the 1919 strike, largely because of the crash 
6
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and the degression.  Moreover, the nassage of a generation and the 
prevailing economic conditions limited the effectiveness of pro- 
moting tensions between native and immigrant workers, a tactic 
successfully employed by management in earlier drives.  Immigration 
restriction, in 1921 and 1924, reduced the number of new Eastern 
Europeans working in the mills, and naturalization took care of 
many others; most immigrant steel workers were now firmly committed 
to their new country.  For the most part, the steel companies could 
no longer rely on reviving xenophobic prejudices as a tactic to 
promote tensions between native born and immigrant workers in the 
8 
plants.  Thus, many who disagreed with the industry's position and 
methods either grew sympathetic to SUOC's cause or went one step 
beyond and joined the union.  Also, many steel workers grew skeptical 
of the coTimanv union and the process involved in electing its 
representatives:  "... the steel workers recognize the farcical 
nature of these elections, in which the only choice permitted is a 
9 
choice of company-union representatives."  However, the nation's 
steel producers continued their anti-union policy and thus, set the 
stage for a confrontation. 
SWOC leaders, realizing the hopelessness of easily gaining 
support and recognition from the steel companies themselves, continued 
8 
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planning their strategy and tactics.  The union's first traior 
effort centered around the Carnep.ie-Tl] inois olant, a subsidiirv 
of the largest and most influential of the steel raanufacturers— 
the United States Steel Cornoration.  U.S. Steel, master of fortv- 
per cent of the steel industry, had refused to recognize an out- 
side union since its formation in 1901.  Lewis once remarked that, 
"United States Steel through the years has been the crouching lion 
in the pathway of Labor.    SUOC expected that those companies 
11 
comprising what was known as Little Steel  would follow any 
major decisions made by Rig Steel (U.S. Steel); a strategy which, 
at the outset, seemed logical.  However, the outcome of the 
organizational effort directed at U.S. Steel and the subsequent 
reaction of Little Steel surprised almost everyone. 
The Employee Representation Plan (ERP) or comoany union 
was a prime target for SWOC agitation.  Industrial unionists 
focused much of their attention and efforts around the ERP because 
it represented the only real center of organization within the 
12 
steel industry.   The union's strategy included the infiltration 
10
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of the corapanv union hy nro-SWOC men.  Thev hoped to pain support of 
comnanv union representatives and thus, work from within to destroy 
the ve.r->' foundations of the "EPP.     Sometimes this tactic worked and 
other times it failed; the actual results depended upon the 
company and the ERP involved. 
The idea of employee representation grew out of a study 
made hy the War Labor Board during World War I.  At that time, it 
was important to maintain industrial peace in order to insure 
the uninterrupted flow of production.  The War Board regarded 
employee representation as a viable means for settling labor dis- 
putes and suggested that company union's be installed in many 
13 
American firms for just that purpose.   However, the idea of 
employee representation spread even further after the great steel- 
strike of 1919. 
Actually, the steel companies saw employee repre- 
sentation at the time of its creation as: ". . . not designed to 
strengthen the bargaining position o?  workingmen, but rather to 
provide, . . . ., 'a definite and durable basis of, mutual under- 
standing and confidence,' or as Inland Steel stated, 'effective 
communication and means of contact. . . and to insure justice, 
14 
maintain tranquility, and promote the general welfare.'" 
13 
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blether the companies truly believed that emplovee representstion 
would accomplish these vague ?oals, remained to be seen.  However, 
the implementation of these systems did help relieve a lot of the 
pressure directed at them from labor groups, the federal government 
and the public. 
Although they did not state this oublicly, most firms 
considered employee representation a means to discourage outside 
15 
unionism.    They based this belief on a number of assumptions. 
First, the nresence of a system of shop government triat handled 
employee grievances would presumably create a more contented work 
force.  Thus, employees would be less likely to look elsewhere 
(outside the confines of the company) for aid and comfort.  Second, 
the success of employee representation depended on the workers' 
comprehension and acceptance of an important stipulation:  "... 
that the firm was an island cut off from contact with other 
16 
companies in the same labor market or the same industry." 
Basically, this meant that workers employed in a specific industry, 
such as steel, but working for different companies, such as 
Bethlehem or U.S. Steel, would remain alienated from each other be- 
cause of physical boundaries.  Thus, their desire to band together 
in a union based on industrial lines would decrease and efforts to 
IS 3lbid. 
16 
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create a closed shop would be thwarted.  For these reasons and also 
because ERP' s were ineffective within the. local shop or plant, labor 
leaders adamantly disapproved of employee representation plans and 
17 
soon labeled them as anti-union devices. 
During the 1920's, a lot of American firms implemented 
employee representation plans; this action, represented a con- 
ceptual change in the attitude of some employers toward their labor 
18 
force in general.   Under previous terms of employment, workers had 
few guaranteed rights or privileges; they were considered, more or 
less, a commodity.  The institution of employee representation 
sjrstems helped change this perspective.  Regardless of their reasons, 
employers worked toward developing a more contented labor force. 
Obviously, labor stood to gain something, even if it was minimal, 
from the new attitudes and methods adopted by management.  However, 
the extent to which employers were willing to go in this direction, 
eventually determined the amount of success they achieved; to the 
steel industry, success meant, for the most part, the defeat of 
unionism and the continuation of the open shop. 
However, employee representation surprised both business- 
men and union leaders alike when it produced some unexpected results. 
Ironically, the ERP provided an important service to the unions.  It 
17 
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educated workers and made them aware of the potential benefits to 
be pained from collective bargaining.  The experience and knowledge 
they acquired from the company union, convinced manv workers to 
19 
demand self-organization later on.   Moreover, in many instances 
the ERP provided good training for future labor leaders and 
20 
organizers. 
In addition, specific employee representation plans, 
such as the one at Bethlehem Steel, received considerable publicity. 
Thus, the public increased its awareness of the problems that labor 
faced in an industrialized society.  This knowledge aided labor's 
cause.  "Employers who might later seek to turn the clock back 
would meet resistance not just from the labor movement but also 
21 
from an enlightened public opinion." 
The depression of the 1930's and the resultant New Deal 
legislation, the NIRA and the NLRA, threatened the harmony in 
industrial relations which the steel companies enjoyed during the 
1920's because of general prosperity and the ERP.  "A change in 
22 
steel industry labor relations was established by law." 
Tn the early 1930's, ERP's sprang up in many companies. 
Most of the basic steel industry along with a number of fabricating 
19 
Ibid., p. 172. 
20 
Hogan, Iron and Steel Industry, Vol. Ill, pp. 1167-1168, 
21 
Bernstein, The Lean Years, p. 186. 
22 Hogan, Iron and Steel Industry, Vol. Ill, p. 1167. 
28 
mills adopted company unions.  At the end of 1934, a minimum, o^ 
93 formal nlans were in existence.  They covered between 90 and 
23 
95 per cent of the plant workers in steel.    However, the 
installation of these plans, "... represented a method of 
compliance with the law without actually yielding to any outside 
.,24 
labor organization. 
However, many workers showed signs of dissatisfaction 
25 
with this system of representation, even before SWOC was created. 
These sentiments were particularly evident at U.S. Steel, where the 
26 
company union was a relatively new phenomenon.    U.S. Steel in- 
stalled its ERP at all its plants in 1933, after the enactment of 
the NIRA.  In 1936, many of the employee representatives at 
several Carnegie-Illinois plants worked toward making the company 
unions more effective.  They became increasingly more independent 
of management.  These employee representatives demanded greater 
control over their organization, higher wages and better xjorkirg 
conditions.  Many of these men, through their experiences with the 
ERP, seemed more susceptible to an all-out appeal for unionization. 
"Far from placating the workers, the company unions became rallying 
23 
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27 
points for independent action and pro-CTO sentiment."   SVOC 
leaders perceived this new activism a»nong workers as beneficial to 
their objectives and prepared to take advantage of  the situation. 
Thus, SUOC planned to infiltrate the company unions and take them 
over if necessary. 
To accomplish this task, union organizers established 
contact with employee-representatives holding pro-union sympathies. 
"Philip Murray's plan was to operate through such representatives 
as these, encourage them to develop even greater independence, urge 
them to press the demands which they had already made and keep 
28 
them 'biting at the heels of management.'" 
Employee representatives, influenced by SWOC's program, 
pressed for a $5.00 a day minimum wage, an eight-hour day, a 
forty-hour week, time-and-a-half for overtime, and recognition 
of central committees.  In July, 1936, U.S. Steel announced its 
decision accepting the eight-hour day and a ^orty-eight hour week. 
A storm of protest arose from SWOC and manv U.S. Steel employees, 
denouncing the decision as a trick to impose a forty-eight hour 
week after a forty-hour one was already in effect under the NIRA. 
As a result, many disillusioned workers supported SWOC's independent 
organizing efforts and joined their ranks. 
27 
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Benjamin F. Fairless, president of Carnegie-Illinois, 
refused to grant the wage increase demands on the grounds that the 
company was financially unable to do so.  Philip Murray, SWOC's 
chairman, backing the company union's wage demands argued that the 
corporations profits allowed them to meet workers' demands.  Finally, 
the company agreed to put the wage increase into effect unilaterally 
in all its plants.  "The SWOC was able to point to the wage increase 
as a vindication of its earlier position that the corporation could 
,29 
afford higher wages. 
By November, 1936, SWOC's organizing drive had made 
substantial headway.  The union claimed a total membership of 
82,000 and the support of 1,534 out of 2,500 company union 
30 
representatives in the steel industry.   But further progress in 
this area seemed unlikely, therefore, SWOC altered part of its basic 
strategy.  After exploiting the company unions to the limit, SWOC 
moved toward the direction of securing an independent organization— 
its ultimate goal—to represent Carnegie-Illinois' employees. 
Therefore, to discredit the company union, SWOC filed charges with 
the NLRB against Carnegie-Illinois, alleeine unlawful company 
domination of their ERP; SWOC called for the disestablishment of 
the company union.  Thus, the union's strategy changed from in- 
filtrating the company union to discrediting and forcing the break- 
29 
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down of these organizations; SWOC took full advantage of the pro- 
union and pro-labor stance of the federal government and demanded 
intervention and legislation regarding company unions.  As the 
months passed, the influence of the EP.P lessened and its chances 
before the NLRB appeared hopeless.  Although progress moved slowly, 
SWOC carried on their intensive organizing campaien.  Tn addition, 
a strike for SWOC's recognition seemed forthcoming. 
The fear of an impending strike, along with other circum- 
stances, brought a surprising outcome to SWOC's organizing drive 
aimed at Big Steel.  After a series of secret meetings between 
John L. Lewis and Myron C. Taylor, U.S. Steel's Chairman of the 
Board, the United States Steel Corporation chose to end its long- 
standing opposition to unionism rather than face a lengthy strike. 
On March 2, 1937, Philip Murray and Benjamin F. Fairless signed an 
historic industrial agreement.  Murray commented that, "This is 
unquestionably the greatest story in the history of the American 
31 
Labor Movement." 
The agreement recognized SWOC as the bargaining agent 
for its members only, while SWOC agreed not to intimidate or 
coerce non-union employees into membership.  Tn addition, the 
settlement granted the basic wage and hour demands of employee 
representatives and SWOC.  The minimum daily wage was raised to 
five-dollars and a fortv-hour week was established with time-and-a- 
31
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half nay for all hours in excess of eisht-hours "er dav or fortv- 
hours ie.r week.  Subsenuently, a similar apreement was extended to 
other U.S. Steel subsidiaries.  "But the unionization of U.S. Steel 
was a John I,. Lewis triumph, pure and simple. . . .  Now the chief 
bastion of the onen shop had fallen without so much: as a solitary 
32 
picket."   Lewis remarked about his meetings and negotiations 
with Taylor which produced this historic agreement.  "We were each 
conscious of the great weight of responsibilitv and the far-reaching 
consequences attached to our decisions.  Labor, industry, and the 
.33 
nation will be the beneficiaries." 
Almost simultaneously, five of steel's independents— 
Bethlehem, National, Pepublic, voungstown and Inland—granted the 
same wage and hour demands -just announced by U.S. Steel and its 
subsidiaries.  However, this action did not represent peaceful 
compliance or capitulation on the part of Little Steel with the 
SVOC-Big Steel apreement.  The intention of Little Steel to adopt 
its own independent course of action and to maintain its anti-union 
tradition became increasingly evident as the months passed. 
The responsibility for the successful unionization of U.S. 
Steel did not solely rest with the efforts of SVOC and their leaders, 
The corporation decided to bargain collectively with SWOC after 
32 
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carefully evaluating the prevailing economic and political 
34 
situation.   U.S. Steel, recovering from the adverse effects of 
the depression, bepan earninp substantial profits, because of 
recovery and rearmament, and could not afford the consequences 
generated by a major strike.  The company hoped to gain a contract 
from Great Britain, then in the process of arranging a purchase 
of large amounts of steel for its rearmament program.  But they 
insisted on a guarantee of uninterrupted production before letting 
35 
contracts.   Thus, the historic conditions of the period, both 
political and economic, directly influenced the outcome of the union 
movement aimed at Big Steel.  The national political atmosphere 
which brought about specific New Deal legislation and the re- 
election of Roosevelt in 1936, with labor's backing, encouraged 
the union movement, influenced the steel settlement and marked a 
decided victory for trade unionism. 
Unionization of the entire steel industry now seemed 
inevitable.  Throughout the decade, the industry found it 
increasingly necessary to yield, at least partially, to labors' 
demands.  Many steel firms implemented welfare programs, stock 
subscription plans, bonus systems, and employee representation 
nlans—everything short of actual unionization.  "Once it had in- 
34 




stalled employee representation, the United States Steel Corporation 
had exhausted its string of offers and when the plans had run their 
course, the only logical step that remained to insure orderly 
industrial relations seemed to be the recognition of an 
independent union." 
Moreover, U.S. Steel found itself in an awkward position. 
Its Carnegie-Illinois employee representation plan faced investiga- 
tion by the National Labor Relations Board, while the La Follette 
Civil Liberties Committee prepared an investigation of the 
corporation's labor espionage practices.  Thus, the federal govern- 
ment and public opinion refused to support forcible suppression 
37 
of trade unionism. 
The resulting settlement marked a decided compromise 
between union and management forces.  The union profited by 
gaining recognition, however, they abandoned one of their major 
objectives.  According to the terms of the agreement, SWOC could 
not act as the sole collective bargaining agent on a company-wide 
basis.  The contract allowed the union to represent only those em- 
ployees holding membership in the union. Moreover, Carnegie- 
Illinois reserved the right to bargain with its company union or 
any other group of employees. 
Nevertheless, the steel settlement pleased SWOC leaders 
36 
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immensely.  After Big Steel signed with the union, SWOC's member- 
ship grew rapidly.  By May 1, 1937, the union claimed a membershin 
of 280,000 steel workers within eiehty-eight different companies. 
By that time, SWOC also negotiated union contracts with over 
fifty steel companies and almost five-hundred lodges functioned 
in the nation's steel centers.  Also, a few of the smaller 
independent firms fell in line and signed contracts with SWOC. 
However, these impressive results in no way concluded SWOC's 
organizing campaign. 
To the surprise of most everyone, Little Steel's 
reaction to the agreement brought the successful organizing drive 
to a momentary halt.  The large independent steel producers thought 
Big Steel's concession, ". . .a shocking betrayal of the industry's 
38 
traditional united front against unionism."   Although many of 
these firms immediately consented to and implemented the specific 
wage and hour demands set down by the SWOC-U.S. Steel agreement, 
they refused to sign similar contracts with SWOC or bargain with 
any labor organization outside of their own company unions.  This 
necessitated the development of a new plan of action, on the part 
of SWOC, to meet their next challenge of organizing the Little Steel 
companies.  Basically, "... the industry vras  only about half 
39 
'in the bag' and the independents controlled the other half." 
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Chapter TIT 
SWOC and Little Steel 
The second phase of SWOC's organizing drive proved much 
more difficult and time consuming.  This time SWOC faced a croup of 
tough and violently anti-union steel masters putting forth a concerted 
effort to ston SWOC's continued success.  The steel men involved in 
this included Eugene Grace of Bethlehem, Tom Girdler of Republic, 
Fran! Purnell of Youngstowr. Sheet and Tube, Ernest T. Weir of 
National, L.E. Bloch of Inland, N.E. Lewis of Jones and Laughlin 
and Charles R. Hook at the American Foiling Mills. These larger 
indenendent steel companies employed more than 200,000 men and 
produced about one-fourth of the nation's steel.  The management it 
these firms nrenared to face the nrosnect of strikes and other such 
disturbances to maintain an open-shop in their comoanies.  "In 
short, Little Steel was convinced that the cost of winning a strike 
was outbalanced by the future gains that would accrue from the 
absence of trade unions in the mills.  The ideological convictions 
of the Little Steel leaders served to augment the value of the 
expected flow of future benefits."  Thus, Little Steel set the 
stage for the coming battle with SWOC. 
1 
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Determined to use the strike onlv as a last resort, SWOC 
planned for future negotiations with steel's management and for 
potential use of the NLRB to gain progress toward their objective. 
Again, SWOC's tactics included capturing the employee representation 
plans at the remaining unorganized companies.  Previous use of this 
scheme proved advantageous and SWOC seemed confident they could 
repeat that kind of success elsewhere.  However, Republic felt 
SWOC's efforts would be futile since thev maintained, what was in 
their eyes, a great industrial relations system with good men backing 
it up.  But SWOC perceived the situation much differently.  "Sure, 
they've got good men heading their shop groups.  They've got the 
best men.  All the same, they're going to be surprised to find that 
we've got the same men, in lots of cases. When it comes right down 
to a decision, this whole thing stands or falls on the will of the 
2 
guys in the mills, and we've got the guys."  The union already 
claimed substantial progress at Jones and Laughlin, Youngstown and 
Inland.  However, SWOC had little support at Bethlehem, except at 
the Cambria Works in Johnstown and probably not much even there; 
this was due, in large part, to the strength of Bethlehem's EFP. 
In the spring of 1937, the. union began the second phase 
of their organizing drive and concentrated most of their efforts 
around Jones and Laughlin.  In May, SWOC called a strike at the 
8, 1937, P. 17. 
2„ 
"Next—The Steel Independents," Business Week, I, May 
Aliauiopa and Pittsburgh plants of that firm; thev shut down the 
nations' fourth largest steel producer, threw 27,000 men out of 
3 
vorh, and launched the biggest steel strike since 1919.   The next 
day 6,000 emplovees of Pittsburgh Steel joined then.  The Jones and 
Laughlin strike lasted only thirty-six hours with little violence 
occurring.  The strike ended when management agreed to an NLRB 
election to determine by majority vote if SWOC should have exclusive 
bargaining rights for all its employees.  With all the balloting in, 
the Labor Board confirmed SWOC's strength when it announced that 
17,000 men, seventy per cent of those voting, supported SWOC.  Thus, 
SWOC won their first major battle against Little Steel and became 
the exclusive bargaining agent for all Jones and Laughlin workers; 
the rest of the agreement resembled that of Big Steel's.  Horace 
Edward Lewis, chairman of the company, commented on the settlement. 
"The Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation is gratified that such an 
important issue has been so amicably settled by peaceful and 
democratic methods, under the provisions of the Wagner Act."  >fore- 
over, he urged that all tensions be forgotten and all work be re- 
sumed.  Other smaller steel firms followed suit, among them Crucible 
and Sharon Steel.  However, SWOC's attempt to unionize the remaining 
portion of the Little Steel producers proved much more difficult 
and involved a far greater expenditure of time and resources. 
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The resistance of Little Steel partially decreased when 
the Sunretne Court, in 1937, declared the Wagner Act constitutional. 
However, SWOC's prohlems continued when the steel independents 
agreed to bargain and perhaps enter into oral agreements with SWOC, 
but staunchly refused to put anything down in writing; a totally 
legal nolicy, according to the steel masters, since the Wagner Act 
required only bargaining, not written contracts.  In regard to this 
policy, a determined Philin Murray remarked, "I tell you, a strike 
5 
will inevitably trail in the wake of this maddening policy." 
SWOC, unwilling to tangle with Bethlehem Steel or National 
Steel at that time, centered their attention on three other large 
independents:  Republic, Inland, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. 
SWOC realized the necessity of continuing their winning streak, in 
regard to their organizational drive aimed at these next three 
companies.  The union needed to win this fight in order to gain 
more momentum, keep up morale, and maintain public sentiment toward 
their cause.  If they happened to lose in the Midwest steel area, 
public support of their objective might falter.  "The industrial 
unionization cause will lose a great measure of 'ever victorious' 
psychology which has aided the movement thus far.  Lines of defense 
will harden against it all over the country and it must meet more 
6 
companies which will take Republic Steel's nolicv as a guide."  Thus, 
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SWOC leaders, realizing the importance of a successful organizing 
drive, prepared for their next line of action. 
A wave of bitter and violent strides broke out in May, 
1937, when the three firms—Republic, Inland and Voungstown— 
refused to make written agreements with SWOC, arguinp that the 
Wagner Act did not require them to do so.  After all other means 
failed, a strike call was issued.  The walk-out effected twenty- 
seven steel nlants, most of them in Ohio and Illinois.  The shut- 
down virtually brought fifteen per cent of the steel industry to a 
standstill and Trent 75,000 men out of work in the midst of steel's 
7 
busiest season in years. 
Renublic Steel defended their position when they declared 
that they practiced "collective bargaining" and paid "high wages." 
But they refused to sign a contract because it represented, in their 
opinion, the first step toward the eventual break down of the open- 
8 
shop system and the ultimate success of outside unionism.   In many 
respects, the industry's fears were -justified, since SWOC and their 
members hoped to achieve those particular goals. Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube expressed similar sentiments and fears regarding signed 
contracts when they stated: 
The signed agreement demanded of us could not 
be enforced by us because it would be a one- 
sided instrument whereunder the employer alone 
7„ 
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would Dossess legal responsibility. . . .  The 
wage rates requested have been and are in effect. 
The companv has been, now is and will continue to 
be willing to meet and negotiate with renre- 
sentatives chosen by its employes for all pur- 
noses of collective bargaining upon grievances, 
wages, hours of labor and conditions of work.  9 
Thus, the three steel independents, believing they acted 
legally under the Wagner Act by bargaining but not signing con- 
tracts, followed a oolicy that forced them to face a shut down and 
its possible conseauences.  Little Steel also developed and followed 
a strategy which included sitting tight, waiting for back-to-work 
movements among anti-SWOC employees to begin, and hopefully in- 
10 
creasing public support for the right-to-work concept. 
Strike action continued and at the Republic olant in 
Chicago an especially violent and bloody one transpired.  The 
strike claimed ten lives and injured many others when police opened 
fire on the large crowd which contained both strikers and bystanders, 
Later, the La Follette Senate Committee, after investigating the 
incident, concluded that, "The first shots came from the police. . . 
11 
unprovoked."   The so-called "Memorial Day Massacre," caused a 
sorrowful and outraged Van A. Bittner to remark, "I pledge to you, 
I pledge to my union, I pledge to my country and my God, that the 
men who committed those murders will be treated as murderers should 
9lbid., pp.   14-15. 
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12 be treated." 
On June 11, 1937, workers struck the Bethlehem Steel 
Cambria Mill at Johnstown, Pennsylvania.  John L. Lewis called the 
strike in sympathy with the one already in progress among two 
Railway Brotherhoods on the Coneraaugh and Blacklick Railroad, a 
Bethlehem subsidiary; the ten-mile strip of railroad track connected 
the company's Cambria plant with the Pennsylvania Railroad.  The 
railroad workers walked-out after the companv refused to grant 
them a written contract. 
The Cambria strike was unsuccessful due to the strength 
of the company union there and the weakness of SWOC; however, the 
plant did shut down for a week after Governor Earle declared 
martial law because of widespread violence.  The plant finally re- 
opened on June 27, as many steel workers returned to their iobs. 
SWOC, for the first time in its organizing drive, faced 
the possibility of a ma.-jor defeat.  Although Bethlehem and Republic 
refused to even discuss the question of an oral or written agree- 
ment and were unwilling to meet with either Lewis or Murray, they 
did agree to meet with local union representatives on a plant by 
13 
plant basis. 
Thus, something had to be done to settle the question of 
whether or not collective bargaining resulted if no written agreement 
12 
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materialized from oral negotiations.  For this was the major obstacle, 
preventing anv further progress toward organizing America's steel 
workers.  All of SWOC's efforts came to a standstill; unable to 
move in any direction since the Little Steel companies found a 
loophole in the Wagner Act and staked most of their anti-union fight 
on that one point. 
The nation's steel employers refused to embody in a signed 
contract with the union the same terms they agreed to during 
negotiations.  A contemporary magazine stated that," . . . the issue, 
like the issue in most wars, is a symbol that embodies unrecognized 
14 
and unreasoned emotional drives."   Company officials believed that 
written agreements were unnecessary because obligations could be 
fulfilled without them.  They included other reasons for following 
such a policy.  First, contracts usually give unions too much power 
and prestige. Moreover, labor leaders demanded that written agree- 
ments be negotiated annually, even if the old contract did not need 
15 
changes or improvements.   The industry felt that this forced them 
to face the risk of shut-downs if the two parties failed to come to 
i 
terms.  Second, written terms\ of employment, being inflexible, do 
not meet rapidly changing conditions.  Third, signed contracts do 
14
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16 
not guarantee industrial peace.   Whether refusing to sign a con- 
tract would be an affective means of crushing the union movement 
altogether, remained to be seen.  However, this tactic allowed the 
remaining unorganized companies to halt the union's progress for 
an indefinite period of time. 
Regardless of Little Steel's reasons for not signing 
agreements with SWOC, the legal question still went unanswered. 
Tf a company refused to sign, were they really bargaining in good 
faith?  This question remained unresolved and a threat to the 
future success of SWOC's organizing drive. 
President Roosevelt had his own opinions concerning the 
problem of written contracts.  The President stated that, "If a 
fellow was willing to enter a verbal agreement with his workers, 
common sense dictates that he should be willing to sign his 
17 
name to it."   Moreover, the act of reducing verbal agreements to 
paper had always been considered an indispensable evidence of good 
faith in any kind of business dealing. 
The steel masters would not budge on this noint until the 
lav actually compelled them to.  Thus, in order to bring industrial 
peace, Roosevelt established, on June 17, 1937, the Federal Steel 
Mediation Board.  He then personally telephoned the nation's steel 
16 
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masters asking for their cooperation.  Secreatary of Labor Frances 
Perkins, appointed three men to the board, with two out of the 
three being heavily weighted toward CIO objectives.  The members of 
the board included Lloyd K. Harrison, dean of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School and the great-grandson of the famed Abolitionist, 
also the first chairman of the NLRB in 1935 and considered a New 
Deal liberal; Edward F. McGrady, the Administration's labor con- 
ciliator, and an active figure in mediating the West Coast maritime 
strike; and Charles Philip Taft II, son of the late ^resident and 
Chief Justice.  Taft, "... was no New Dealer of the Rooseveltian 
strioe, but a socially-conscientious progressive known to view old- 
fashioned strong-arm methods by management with as much alarm as 
18 
he might feel about Labor's new truculence."   Taft accented the 
appointment as chairman of the Mediation Board after informing 
Secretary Perkins that his wife owned fifty shares of Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube stock and thirty shares of Inland Steel stock.  Thus, 
observers rated the Board at least two to one in favor of labor. 
However, the steel masters remained reluctant to sign 
contracts, regardless of mediation attempts, with what they termed 
an organization with the communistic dictates and terrorism of the 
CIO.  Tom Girdler reportedly remarked that, "Whenever the law says 
I have to sign a contract and the law is properly upheld, then I'll 
18Ibid. 
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have to sign a contract. ...  I won't sicn a contract with an 
irresponsible, racketeering, violent, communistic organization like 
the C.I.O. and until the law requires me to do so, I am not going 
19 
to do it."   But SWOC also had colorful words to hail against the 
steel masters.  Murray stated that, "A nersistant, brazen policy 
of intimidation has been practiced. ...  In dozens of local 
communities these steel barons have created armed camps where any 
act of violence on the part of their agents, including wholesale 
murder of innocent and defenseless workers, can occur with impunity 
and without obligation to account to the law."   Thus, tensions 
on both sides continued to flare nutting pressure on the Mediation 
Board to affect some kind of a settlement rather quickly.  For the 
moment, all hope rested with the Board. 
The steel men attended the Board's first meetinr, even 
21 
though they felt the Board was biased against them.    Eventually, 
the Mediation Board proposed that union recognition be determined 
from the outcome of an NLRB conducted election.  But the steel firms 
refused to complv with this recommendation.  Little hope remained 
that the Board could affect a compromise or settlement of some 
sort.  Both sides steadfastly clung to their objectives.  The fight 
continued as all concerned vied for public support of their cause. 
19 
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The nation's steel nrnducers continued their anti-union 
fipht.  "Driven into each other's arms hy U.S. Steel's settlement, 
a desertion of their cause for which they have never forgiven 
Myron Taylor and probablv never will, they were now engaged in 
trving to win to their side the strongest of all allies, Public 
22 
Opinion."   The steel masters already met with success in this 
regard in many of the nation's steel centers.  Tn the Mahoning 
Valley, around Youngstown, citizens demanded law and order and de- 
fense of the right-to-work.  Local governments were granted authority 
to increase their police force and to purchase additional equipment 
needed to oreserve order.  In other cities, steel workers were 
nolled toward their feelings about going back to work.  In many 
instances, the votes favored an end to the strike.  With the validity 
of the balloting in Question, the voting itself showed basic anti- 
strike sentiment.  But, as mentioned previously, SWOC also realized 
the necessity of having public opinion on their side.  "And Public 
Opinion, without the support of which no major strile is ever won, 
(    seemed to be swinging slowly, imponderablv to the side of em- 
\ 23 
battled steelmasters." 
Refusing to give an inch in any direction, the nation's 
Little Steel producers, although unsuccessful, attempted to reopen 
many of their plants.  Roosevelt wanted the plants to remain closed 
22 
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until the Mediation'Board had a chance to" complete 'its' task.  Tn 
Ohio, the Governor complied with the President's wishes by sending 
out the state militia to preserve the status quo.  "The plants 
stayed closed and, rare in U.S. history, the strikers greeted the 
24 
arrival of troops with loud cheers."   One anti-union steel master 
complained about the prevailing situation.  "What right has the 
Governor to send troops in to prevent men from working?  The 
Governor's job is to protect men who wish to work. . .  It's gotten 
25 
so now that a man can't work in this country when he wants to." 
The Federal Steel Mediation Board prepared to adlourn, 
in July, 1937, for lack of accomplishment on any major scale.  At 
the same time, the steel masters received welcome news from many of 
the nation's steel cities.  Since it became increasingly evident 
that the strikes would not be settled by mediation, the back-to- 
work sentiment of many steel workers forced local governments to 
protect their rights over the right-to-strike.  Although they faced 
the nossibility of further bloodshed and violence, steel plants 
around the country began opening their gates.  This time, those that 
filed back to their jobs received the protection of the troops; 
26 
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Therefore, as steel workers returned to work and the Mediation 
Board closed up shop, SWOC faced the realities of a maior defeat 
for the first time in their organizing campaign. 
Many contemporaries attributed the success of the steel 
companies to a premeditated plan of action on the part of Little 
Steel.  The tactics, previouslv devised by James H. Rand, Jr., 
were implemented to quell the 1936 strikes at Remington Rand.  The 
so-called "Mohawk Valley Formula" was publicized by the National 
Association of Manufacturers.  Later, the steel industry used this 
formula as a reference point in developing their anti-union strategy 
27 
and tactics.   The Formula s methods included gaining support of 
the local community and its press to generate a back-to-work rnove- 
ment.  In order to do this, they pictured the strike as revolution 
and the strikers as aliens and communists, while distorting the 
strikers side of the story in the newspaper.  Thus, the local 
communities did not really understand what actually occurred.  This 
proved to be an important element in getting the back-to-work move- 
ments off the ground.  The anti-strike campaign also included break- 
ing the morale of the steel workers and turning the general public 
against the strike—to isolate strikers from the rest of the 
community, then turn the community against the strikers.  The attempt 
to demoralize the strikers themselves included spreading propaganda 
27 
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that the strike failed, that men started returning to work, and that 
28 
strikers should do the same before they lost their -jobs.   Moreover, 
company officials stimulated the organization of citizens' committees 
and vigilante groups and used every available force to break the 
29 
picket lines and suppress demonstrations.   If this kind of action 
truly represented the structural plan of the Little Steel companies, 
it met with temporary success and SWOC had underestimated their 
power and influence.  An NLRB investigation of Bethlehem Steel's 
strike at its Johnstown plant confirmed the fact that the Johnstown 
Citizens' Committee, "... was at least inspired and—at least to 
the extent of $30,000—financed by the Bethlehem Steel Company as 
30 
part of its campaign to break the strike."   SWOC failed to 
organize Inland, Republic, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, specifically 
because of the concerted effort put forth by Little Steel to stop 
31 
the union movement from gaining any further headway. 
As strike action halted and men filed back to their jobs, 
SWOC had a chance to review its position, strengthen its leadership 
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and plan its next course of action.  However, there was one rav of 
sunshine; it apneared when Inland Steel nlanned the onenin? of its 
East Chicago plant without a CIO agreement.  Governor Ilaurice 
Townsend refused to send troops for the occasion, hut he did manage 
to affect a compromise settlement between the CIO and Inland, "... 
at least temporarily, by getting each side to pledge certain things 
32 
to him though not to each other."   The company pledged not to 
discriminate between strikers and non-strikers as the men returned 
to work.  Van A. Bittner remarked:  "For God's sake don't let any- 
,      33 
thing interfere! We've obtained a very fine settlement."   An in- 
formal truce between SWOC and Youngstown also occurred.  The company 
changed a few of its policies regarding vacations and SWOC called 
off its pickets.  There seemed no other choice for the steel union, 
except to sit back and wait for the results of the NLRB case filed 
against Inland Steel regarding the question of signed contracts. 
SWOC publicly refused to claim defeat, even though this 
was obvious to all concerned.  However, it was also certain that 
Little Steel had not heard the last of SWOC.  "From now on the 
strike will become a campaign of attrition—to harass the companies 
at every step with the hope of raising the cost of making steel to 
„34 
a point where any settlement would seem street. 
32




"Labor," Time, 30, July 19, 1937, p. 15. 
52 
Another dimension was added to the existing bleak outlook 
regarding any immediate progress toward SWOC's main obiectives. 
This time it was economic in nature.  An economic recession, in 
May, 1937, posed another obstacle to the organizing campaign.  The 
recession made the Little Steel companies harden their defenses 
35 
against the advance of unionism even further. 
In December, steel output declined seventy per cent 
from the August rate, payrolls were almost cut in half and unemploy- 
ment rose.  The union estimated that 224,000 steel and allied workers 
were laid off and that only a small number of those still employed 
36 
worked full time.    Consequently, union membership sagged and dues 
collection suffered.  However, SWOC aided its members as best they 
could throughout the impending crisis and thus produced for them- 
selves a loyal organization.  At SWOC's first national convention 
in December, 1937, Lewis stated: 
The time has come when labor must exercise its 
rights to organize.  If labor is content to let 
things drift, we will drift to a crash—to an 
economic and financial crash—that will involve 
the political government of America and bring to 
America. . . the same sort of fascist control 
that you can look about you and see flourishing 
in the world today, . . . That is the form of 
government that many of our great financial and 
industrial leaders secretly hope will be brought 
about.  37 
35 
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Although he used strong and unfounded accusations, Lewis obviously 
tried to sustain the impetus needed to organize the nation's nass 
production industries in the face of ever increasing oroblems and 
obstacles.  But, with defeat in the 1937 Little Steel strike and 
worsening economic conditions, both STJoc and the CIO lost, at least 
38 
for the time being, the momentum of 1936 and 1937. 
The economic recession further irritated the situation 
when, in February, 1938, executives of U.S. Steel and the general 
staff of SWOC met to negotiate a new contract.  The effects of the 
on-going recession and the realities of it forced the union to yield 
ground in formulating its new agreement.  All the basic provisions 
of the first contract remained—seniority, paid vacations, a basic 
five-dollar a day minimum wage, a forty-hour week with time-and-a- 
half for overtime.  However, something different was added to the 
agreement—an escape clause.  Instead of running for a full year, 
the contract could be reopened on ten days' notice by either side, 
and if no agreement was reached within the next twenty days, the 
contract would lapse.  In effect, this meant that U.S. Steel could 
initiate a wage cut whether or not the union agreed to it.  Under 
the old contract, a straight one-year agreement, wages could not be 
cut during the life of the document.  Lewis tried to remain optimistic 
about the arrangement while pointing to the preservation of the 
current wage structure; "... the fact that our minds were able to 
38 
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meet on questions of principle and policy is a tribute to Mr. , . 
Taylor not only as a leader of industry but as an American devoted 
to the furtherance of rational relationships and national 
39 
stability." 
The recession lasted through 1938, and the first seven 
months of 1939, but was followed by the start of the World War II 
boom.  The boom eventually enabled the steel union to strengthen its 
lodges, expand its membership drive and reinstate those forced to 
drop out because of the state of the economy.  But until this time, 
SWOC relied on its old friend, the MLRB, to at least maintain and 
maybe even strengthen its position. 
Throughout the ensuing years, 1938-1940, the MLRB made 
important verdicts that affected the growth and eventual success of 
SWOC.  The Board rescued the union from total inactivity and progress 
on the labor front.  One contemporary news magazine stated in an 
article: 
If steel labor history repeated itself, this 
defeat (the 1937 Little Steel strike) should 
have settled the labor problems of Mr. Girdler 
and his friends for a decade or two.  But, 
until recently, labor history never knew an 
unassuming lawyer named J. Warren Madden and 
the National Labor Relations Board over which 
he efficiently resides.  Last week, what 
S.W.O.C. lost on the picket lines it was re- 
trieving through the NLRB.  40 
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The article rrferred to the resolution of two cases fi]ed against 
the Re-mblic and Inland Steel firms.  The Board':r,   Inland decision 
I.eld that an emnlover must be willing to reduce an oral agreement 
to writing, after collective bargain in? with ennlovees1 representa- 
tives and that Inland's assertion of unwillingness to do so con- 
stituted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act.  Finallv, 
the loonhole in the Wagner Act, found by the steel independents 
and used by them to support their resistance to unionism, was 
closed.  Moreover, the Board ordered Inland to stop recognizing 
their company union and to bargain with SWOC. 
The NLRR also found Republic in flagrant violation of the 
Labor Act.  Referring to the strike last July in Ohio, they found 
the companv responsible for causing the strike; the charges also 
included:  open sponsorship of company unions, discriminatory dis- 
charges of union members, espionage, terrorism, incitement of 
violence, and responsibility for an unprovoked attack on strikers 
resulting in death and inlury to strikers, sympathizers and innocent 
bystanders.  The HLFB ordered the corporation to stop interfering 
with the self-organization of its workers, to dissolve its company 
union and to reinstate with back nay some estinated 5,000 workers who 
went on strike and those dismissed previous to the strike for union 
activities.  This case showed how the steel companies had prevented 
41 
their employees from organizing into outside unions.   torn Girdler 
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described various parts of the decision as "startling" and "as- 
tounding" and promised to ". . . take full advantage of all 
42 
rights . . . under the law." 
The NLRB made another important decision that eventually 
effected the conditions and circumstances surrounding the next phase 
of SWOC's drive, in 1941, aimed at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 
The Board, in August, 1939, ordered Bethlehem to dissolve its 
43 
employee representation plan because of company domination.   More- 
over, the order stipulated that Bethlehem should end its long- 
standing opposition to SWOC's campaign.  "Ominously S.W.O.C. voted 
its officers full power to take any action necessary if Bethlehem did 
44 
not hurry up and comply."   However, the company refused to implement 
the NLRB's order; instead, they appealed the decision to a higher 
court.  This action only served to irritate the situation even fur- 
ther.  SWOC perceived the company's actions as a flagrant disregard 
of federal law and SWOC used this as ammunition in their later 
struggle, with the company. 
SWOC revised their organizing strategy based on the pre- 
vailing historical situation.  This time thev included an attempt 
to capitalize on the war preparedness issue.  As the Defense Denart- 
42
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merit's armament program Intensified, SWOC increasingly put, pressure 
on the federal government to insure the continued security of 
labor's rights.  Consequently, the government promised to do so by 
demanding that, "All work carried on as nart of the defense program 
should comnly with Federal statutory nrovisions affecting 
45 
labor . . .,"  or no contracts would be established.  Murray re- 
minded the nublic and the government that in the last World War, 
Bethlehem Steel did not maintain its arms quota because of labor 
46 
disputes resulting in strikes.   Murray warned of the possible 
recurrence of the same situation if labor's demands remained un- 
settled; "Total war means total defense.  This is nossible only 
with the full cooperation and participation of labor. . . . Labor 
demands that industry get on with the job by getting on with 
„47 
labor.    The war preparedness issue continued to plague the nation 
and the struggle over who should make more concessions—labor or 
management—remained at the center of the problem. 
At a second national convention, in May, 1940, SWOC 
prepared for renewing its drive.  Union leaders resolved to com- 
plete their organization of the steel industry within the next two 
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into an autonomous international union, somewhat similar to that 
of the United 'line Workers.  In order to reach their objectives, 
the union laid down their strategic plans which again included 
their preference for negotiations and NLRB action.  However, SWOC 
continued to reserve the right-to-strike as a last resort when and 
48 
if all else failed. 
SWOC regained strength and confidence during the years 
after the Little Steel strike of 1937 and the economic recession 
that followed.  This and other factors enabled them to forge ahead 
toward their goals and renew their organizing struggle aimed at 
America's independent steel producers.  The economic boom created 
by the Defense Department's rearmament program and specific MLRB 
decisions made in the union's favor, made the road ahead look a 
lot brighter.  SWOC's next major effort would prove decisive. 
48 
"S.W.O.C. Launches National Drive," Business Week, I, 
May 18, 1940, pp. 30-31. 
59 
Chapter IV 
Bethlehem's Employee Representation Plan 
The next crucial phase of SWOC's organizing drive beean 
in 1941 when they launched an all-out campaign against Bethlehem 
Steel.   In doing so, the union took on a decisive challenge. 
Bethlehem's company union had been firmly entrenched for many years 
and it enjoyed loyalty and support from the company.  SWOC had to 
devote considerable time and effort in order to discredit and 
eventually destrov Bethlehem's ERP.  The comnany took pride in its 
system of employee representation and would do almost anything; to 
keep it functioning.  However, Murray had a totally different view 
of the ERP.  "Never was a more damnable racket r>ert>etrated in the 
history of American business.  It is corrupt and unhealthy.  It 
constitutes the same kind of law violation as a white slave act 
2 
violation would."  Regardless of what Murray thought, Bethlehem s 
company union survived for a relatively long time during which it 
managed to gain the supoort of many workers. 
By 1920, Bethlehem Steel had successfully implemented 
ERP's at all its plants; it was one of the first American steel 
See Chapter VI for further discussion of SWOC's 
organizing drive aimed at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, in 
1941. 
2 
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companies to do so.  Plagued by a series of strikes in ]918, the 
comnanv followed the suggestions of the National Far Lahor Board 
and created a system of ermlovee representation which berar. 
operating on October 1, 1918.  However, the -jurisdiction of this 
particular plan included all plants except the main one located 
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
At the main plant, a special Bethlehem Plan was installed. 
Moreover, a War Labor Board examiner was sent in to supervise its 
formation and implementation.  Initially, the Board had intervened 
to investigate the cause of labor disputes there and to bring about 
a settlement if possible.  A Presidential proclamation, issued on 
April 9, 1918, allowed the War Labor Board to move in if strikes or 
3 
other problems affected the conduct of the War.   The Board issued 
its findinps on July 31, 1918.  They claimed that workers at 
Bethlehem Steel had the right to collective bargaining through 
shop committees. 
Under the direction of the War Board examiner, the company 
announced, on October 9, 1918, its plans for the creation of shop 
committees.  In October and November of that year, the elections 
of committeemen took place throughout the various shops under the 
watchful eyes of the examiner.  The actual voting occurred during 
regular working hours with the booths and ballot boxes supplied by 
3 
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the company.  Fifteen days prior to the event, a notice appeared in 
each shop informing workers about the upcoming election.  The 
examiner determined that only workers in the employ of Bethlehem 
prior to August 31, 1918, were eligible to vote. 
After this was completed, the War Board instructed 
Bethlehem to negotiate with the newly elected representatives and 
to agree upon a mutually satisfactory plan of collective bargaining. 
Finally, they came to terms and on May 1, 1919, the Bethlehem Plan 
went into operation.  That summer, the company distributed a pamphlet 
to its employees describing the actual details of the plan.  However, 
a series of revisions were made and the final version of the plan 
was announced on January 28, 1920.  Ultimately, the Bethlehem Plan, 
after all the revisions were made and the War Labor Board was no 
longer in existence, closely resembled those plans initiated by the 
5 
company at their other plants. 
The plans, in essence, created to represent the workers, 
to secure and protect their rights, to handle their grievances, 
and to open a line of communication between labor and management 
that would promote understanding and hopefully prevent further dis- 
putes, supposedly, gave workers a means of collective bargaining with 
the company. Whether the ERP would actually accomplish these things, 
4 
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remained to be seen.  Regardless of the outcome, Bethlehem 
developed the plans and set them in motion. 
Bethlehem's plan divided employees into groups determined 
by their specific departments.  One employee representative existed 
for every one-hundred employees or major fraction thereof.  Elections 
of officers and representatives took place annually.  Employees 
voted twice:  once for nomination and again for the election of 
representatives from among the nominees. Workers voted by secret 
ballot during their regular working hours. Any man employed by the 
company for sixty days or more was eligible to vote. 
However, in order to qualify for nomination as an emplovee 
representative, one had to be on the company payroll at least one ' 
full year prior to the first day nominations occurred, at least 
twenty-one years of age and an American citizen. Moreover, the 
plan prevented all managerial or supervisory staff and persons not 
employed by the firm from serving as representatives.  Elected 
representatives served a term of one year which usually began in 
March.  Prior to 1937, the company compensated representatives for 
the time they spent attending general meetings; usually at the rate 
O 
they ordinarily received for their regular work in the plant. 
The plan called for the existence of a general body, with 
officers consisting of a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary, 
elected by that same body.  There were also two sets of committees: 
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a standing committee, made up of employee representatives; and a 
joint committee, formed by adding to the standing committees an 
equivalent number of management representatives. 
At the main plant, because of a large number of employee 
representatives, ". . .an intermediate 'works committee' was inter- 
7 
posed between the general body and the two sets of committees." 
Representatives of each division of the works committee elected 
division representatives from their own numbers on the basis of one 
representative for each five-hundred employees.  These division 
representatives usually numbered between twenty-five to thirty and 
constituted the works committee as distinguished from the general 
body of all representatives.  Under the Bethlehem Plan, the works 
committee elected five of its members to the various standing 
committees which included rules, general committee, wage, safety and 
transportation.  In this way, the Bethlehem Plan differed from 
all the rest.  The plans at smaller plants, choose their standing 
committees directly from the general body of employee representa- 
8 
tives. 
Bethlehem Steel's management appointed five officials 
to the standing committees which they later enlarged and called the 
joint committee.  In the joint committee, a company official usually 
stood as the chairman and an employee, the secretary.  The joint 




committee held meetings every two months while the corresponding 
standing committee met on alternate months.  Tiie worVs committee 
9 
and the general body alternated similarly. 
Under the plan, foremen heard grievances first.  From 
there on, appeals went to department supervisors, to division 
supervisors and then to a management representative or to a joint 
committee.  Decisions could be appealed to the joint committee on 
appeals who reviewed the case, listened to both sides, conducted 
investigations and then voted. A decision required a majority of 
the membership (five from management and five from employee 
representatives).  The possibility also existed for workers to 
appeal unsettled cases all the way up to the general manager and 
then to the president if necessary. 
However, the entire appeal process at Bethlehem was 
rarely used.  Surprisingly, most labor problems reached a settle- 
ment in the departments where they originated.  Foremen and super- 
visors managed to settle eighty-five per cent of the cases they 
heard.  Moreover, only five to seven per cent of the cases reached 
management representatives and only two per cent went further than 
10 
to the joint committee. 
For the most part, Bethlehem Steel initiated and sponsored 




of its business; the plan represented one of the company's most 
11 
important policies.    Since the companv had to atree to some kind 
of collective bargaining for its employees and given Bethlehem's 
lone standing opposition to trade unionism, it is easilv understood 
why thev preferred the ERP to any outside labor organization or 
representative.  Eugene Grace, President of Bethlehem Steel, referred 
to the expressed purpose and meanine of the plan when he remarked: 
"Peace and prosperity in industry rest upon the firm foundation of 
l? friendship and amity between employer and employee." *"  The ERP, by 
giving the worker a means to vocalize his grievances, was to create 
a certain kind of bond between labor and management; a bond that 
was stronp enough to maintain a state of harmony and tranquility 
even during times of labor discontent and disappointment.  Better 
communication between both parties along with a system for handling 
workers' grievances, presumably resulted in higher morale and an 
13 
improvement in productive efficiency among labor.   Moreover, com- 
pany unionism, as an alternative to trade unionism, gave the 
employer a greater advantage in that all policies remained subiect 
to his control.  For example, Bethlehem Steel maintained a veto 
over all amendments to the plans; thus, the essential structure of 
U.S. NLRB, Decisions and Orders of the Labor Board, 
Vol. XIV, p. 594. 
12 
"Bethlehem's Labor Success," Business Week, I, Hay 2, 
1936, p. 30. 
13 Bernstein, The Lean Years, p. 172. 
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14 
the plans could not be altered without the company's consent. 
In order to familiarize the worker with his employer and 
to insure a constant flow of communication downward to the mass of 
Bethlehem's labor force, the company and the ERP began*its publi- 
cation of The Bethlehem Review, on April 24, 1924.  This company 
magazine informed the steel workers about the corporation, Its 
policies and the various plans implemented by the company union. 
President Orace almost always wrote the Review's cover letter and 
addressed his remarks directlv to the employees.  In an early issue, 
Grace expressed his desire for the further development of employee- 
manaeement communication and considered the ERP an excellent means 
to accomplish this.  "The Bethlehem Plan provides not only a definite 
channel through which the emplovees may reach the Management, but at 
the same time gives the Management an opportunity of presenting to 
the employees problems which must be considered in carrying on 
15 
business." 
Basically, the company used the Review as a vehicle to 
express their preference of the ERP over all other forms of 
representation.  Bethlehem took preat pains to convince its employees 
that they were getting the best possible form of representation 
through their company union.  The bulletin's articles praised the 
14 
"U.S. NLRE, Decisions and Orders of the Labor Board, Vol. 
XIV, p. 592. 
15 
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ERP and continually nointed out the advantages and benef i ts--both 
labor and management received from it.  On. the ERP's fifteenth 
anniversary, Grace summed un his feelings about the plan: 
No outside agency could possibly take the nTace 
of our Employees' Representation Plan, without 
destroying that all essential direct contact 
and relationship so necessary to insure to 
employees the best possible working and living 
conditions, and to management the cooperation 
of an intelligently informed body of employees 
. . . . T feel it mv duty to sav plainly that 
no Bethlehem employee is required to belong to 
a labor union to get the full advantages of collec- 
tive bargaining. . . All of these benefits of 
collective bargainine are afforded under our 
Employees' Representation Plan without cost to 
the employee.  16 
With statements such as these, the company probably hoped to assure 
its labor force that they were being taken care of; their own com- 
pany union would secure and protect their rights. 
The ERP heard a variety of cases; manv of labor's 
grievances came to the fore and to the attention of management. 
The complaints heard most often included such issues as:  wages and 
hours, safety and sanitary conditions, housing, health and death 
benefits, and pensions and relief programs.  Other cases involved 
the reinstatement of dismissed men and the implementation of 
technological advances—labor saving devices—in the plant.  During 
the 1920's, the company and the ERP created a number of different 
programs, some of which were based on labor's expressed grievances. 
The Bethlehem Review, 25, 25 Sept. 1933, p. 1. 
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As one employee reoresentative put it, "The employees will look for 
better labor conditions, proper safety devices, better housing, 
better sanitation conditions conducive to health, lust compensation, 
and the settlement of disputes and grievances in a manner by which 
17 
they can be heard and have a voice through one of their own number." 
Tn 1924, the company created an Employees' Raving and 
Stock Ovnershin Plan which gave workers the opportunity to purchase 
shares of seven-per cent cumulative preferred stock at the going 
market rate.  Moreover, the cost of the stock was deducted from 
the employees pay check but payments had to be completed within a 
maximum of twenty-one months.  After Bethlehem enacted its stock 
plan, they encouraged their employees to participate; they expected 
it to be a lucrative proposition in which both labor and business 
would rean the rewards.  The purchase of company stock would give 
workers a more personal stake in helping to make the company prosper. 
As stock owners, they stood to benefit from their share of the com- 
pany's profits.  And the company would have the advantages induced 
18 
from a more loyal and industrious work force.   In addition, 
"Workmen with stock in the company, it is thought, are less likely 
to become involved in labor troubles than if they did not have a 
17The Bethlehem Review, 7, 22 April 1925, p. 2. 
18 
National Industrial Conference Board, Report of the ^.onrd, 
Employee Stock Purchase Plans in the United States (New York: 
National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1928), p. 126. 
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M19 
tangible interest in the business." 
Tn 1924, during the first stock offerint>, 19,675 em- 
ployees (1/3 of all employees) applied for a total of 50,453 
shares (an average of 2   1/2 shares oer worl er) of preferred stocl- 
20 
at the cost of $84.97 ner share.    In 1927, during the fourth 
stock offering, each share cost the worker $107; hut by then, 
35,000 employee stockholders had saved $8,000,000 under the plan. 
Grace remarked:  "Throuph such plans industry is anproaching a nev 
basis of ownershin and understanding by which capital, management 
and workers are united in joint interest and purpose.  This is true 
progress as it not only encourares greater effectiveness in work 
21 
but increases securitv and happiness as well."   However, by 1931, 
the price of stock had risen to $121 per share and in 1932, the 
stock offering was deferred hecause of the bad financial situation 
22 
of most employees due to the depression. 
The company developed and instituted a tension Plan, in 
1923, to provide employees with a supplementary income and partial 
support after their retirement.  A special committee reviewed all 
the applications and then sent their recommendations to a General 
Pension Board that had the final say over acceptances and rejections. 
19 
Ibid., p. 127. 
20 
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The company administered the olan, which was made effective through 
the ERP; employee representatives were consulted in the development 
23 
and application of the system.   In order to qualify for pension, 
steel workers had to be at least sixtv-five years of age and in 
the company's employ for twenty-five years or more.  However, a 
special pension existed for employees totally incapacitated after 
24 
fifteen years of service.   In 1923, the average yearly pension 
25 
totaled $435.84 and in 1928, it had risen to $569.64. 
The Bethlehem Review kept workers informed about the plan, 
how much the company paid out in pensions each year and the total 
number of men on the pension rolls.  For examnle:  in 1931, 
Bethlehem paid out $699,503 in pensions.  That same year, 366 
men retired on pensions after an average service of thirtv-six years 
and an average age of sixty-eight.  At the end of 1931, there were 
1,468 retirees on the pension roll. Moreover, they announced that 
26 
a total of $4,328,198 had been paid out since the plan began. 
On June 1, 1926, an Employee Relief Plan was announced. 
The plan provided disability benefits to men with no income due to 
sickness or accident and death benefits to families or dependents of 
deceased employees.  The company assumed the entire cost of the 
23 
The Bethlehem Review, 25, 25 Sept. 1933, p. 2. 
24 
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plans organization and'administration.  The affairs of the plan and 
the. administration of relief funds were handled 1oint.lv hv emnlovee 
and company trustees (1/2 elected employees and 1/2 management). 
"A significant feature of the Relief Plan is that its administration 
is tied up with the Employees' Representation Plan, and experience 
to date in the handling of cases indicated that this is a very 
27 durable arrangement."   All workers were eligible to receive henefits 
under the plan, however, each nan had the choice of participating in 
it or not.  Employees were placed into three different classes de- 
pending on their earnings.  In Class I, employees with annual earnings 
of $1,500 or less, paid a $1.00 monthly contribution which entitled 
them to a sick benefit of $10.00 per week or  a total death benefit 
of $500.00; in Class II, workers making $l,500-$2,500 paid $1.50 a 
month and received an $11.00 per week sick benefit and a $1,000 
death benefit; and in Class III, those earning more than $2,500 a 
year contributed $2.00 per month and in return got a $12.00 per week 
28 
sick benefit and a $1,500 death benefit.   Under the plan, an 
employee could be reclassified upward but not downward.  The period 
of payment to sick workers varied according to the employees length 
of participation in the plan and term of service with the company. 
29 
However, the maximum coverage was four years.   Moreover, a totally 
27 
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disabled employee, after exhausting his disabilitv benefits, could 
receive, during his life-time, eighty per cent of his death benefit 
with the balance being paid to his beneficiary after his death. 
Under this ontion, those in Class I received installments of $15.OD 
ner month; Class II, $25.00 per month; and Class III, $33.33 a 
30 
month.    In 1932, the Review stated that the company had paid out 
a total of $5,303,835.52 in sick and death benefits since the plan 
began and that more than ninety-eight per cent of all eligible 
31 
employees elected to participate in it. 
The company also had a safety and accident prevention 
program and used the Review to educate the workers toward that goal. 
In a somewhat impersonal manner, they explained the advantages of 
reducing the number of on the job accidents through a comprehensive 
safety plan; "... there is a return to the Employer in lower 
costs, a return to the Employee in a physical and monetary saving, 
and a return to the Community through a lessening of care for the 
32 
maimed and disabled."   Workers were urged to practice individual 
safety and ordinary care while on the lob to avoid accidents.  The 
company did its part by offering a first aid program and by promising 
33 
plant modernization whenever and wherever possible.   By 1927, a 
30 
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34 
total of 8,000 Bethlehem employees had been trained in first aid. 
The company conducted a survey on the number and types 
of accidents occurring in the plants.  The study showed that half 
of all accidents resulted in iniuries to hands or feet; largely to 
the ends of fingers and toes.  In 1924, the Review published a 
chart showing the studv's findings.  Tiey claimed that the maior 
cause of accidents resulted from the handling of material, falling 
or tripping and falling material.  However, the number of accidents 
35 
and deaths declined considerably over the years. 
Because there was always room for improvement in the 
area of safety, the company, in 1928, announced the start of an 
Accident Prevention Contest.  The rules stipulated that the group 
(or olant) that achieved the greatest percentage of reduction in 
time lost due to accident, during each three months' period in that 
year, would receive a grand prize of $1,000 in gold.  Second prize 
was $500 and third was $250.  The best group at the end of the year 
got a trophy.  The contest rules defined accident severity as the 
number of days lost for every one-thousand hours worked.  The winning 
\ 
group had to show the greatest percentage of i.mnrovement in severity 
36 
rate for the two previous years (1926-1927).   In 1929, the company 
announced the results of the contest.  The Steelton group had won 
34The Bethlehem Review, 14, 6 July 1927, p. 3. 
35 
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the contest for the entire vear, reducing their accident severity 
by 52.4 r>er cent; the Bethlehem group finished fourth, reducing 
37 
their accident severity bv 46.7 per cent.    Because the contest 
produced such pood results, the company extended it for another vear, 
Bethlehem conducted a survey, in 1925, to ascertain 
better ways of providing more homes for emplovees as well as aid in 
the financing of homes that workers wished to purchase or build. 
From this, the company's employee housing activities developed into 
a general plan.  The plan was administered by a real estate 
organization, set up at most plants, which functioned under the 
general supervision of the real estate department with headquarters 
in Bethlehem.  The plan was divided into three parts:  the .improve- 
ment of existing homes, the construction of new homes near the 
nlant and aid in the purchase or erection of new homes.  The real 
estate department advised, aided and cooperated with prospective 
home builders.  Moreover, company built homes were sold to the em- 
ployee at the actual cost of production. 
Under this housing program, the worker received archi- 
tectural, engineering, financial and legal advice.  The employee 
obtained full title to the property and was under no obligation 
to the companv as long as he kept up his monthlv payments.  The 
company even took out a life insurance policy on each home builder 
37The Bethlehem Review, 18, 25 January 1929, p. 2. 
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or purchaser during their term of indebtedness.  In addition, pro- 
visions were made for paving off mortgages through monthlv pav- 
38 
ments that were only a little higher than local rents. 
According to The Bethlehem Review, by 1926, the corporation had 
39 
assisted 504 employees to build or buy hones valued at $2,226,000. 
The depression of the 1930's brought an end to the 
development and implementation of new employee related plans and 
programs at Bethlehem.  However, the Review continually reviewed 
and publicized the progress of the old plans and stressed their 
importance at a time of severe economic troubles.  For example, the 
Review reported that the true value of the Relief Plan became 
apparent during the depression years, when its services cared for 
many employees and their families who might otherwise have been 
40 
on public charity pavrolls."   Moreover, workers were reminded 
that the company extended credits on fuel supply, rentals and 
other normal expenditures and deferred payments under the stock 
and housing plans.  The company made generous claims.  However, the 
number of employees that actually benefited from these offerings, 
remained unknown. 
During the depression, one of the major concerns of both 
the company and the ERP revolved around the matter of employment. 
38 
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Bethlehem's basic pmployment policv stated that emnlovees with Ion" 
service, men with families and the most responsible and efficient 
workers received nriTnary consideration as the active labor force, 
41 
with the available work divided among them.    Also, the ERP de- 
veloped an Emergency Employment Program that actually created jobs 
for needy men.  This program allowed workers with special problems 
(large families, sickness or other abnormal circumstances) to in- 
crease their daily or weekly number of working hours.  An emercencv 
42 
relief fund, created for this program, exceeded $1,043,009 in wares. 
This fund enabled the ERP to assist 3,5000 employess that needed 
the additional revenue the most.  Moreover, the ERP advised and 
43 
aided the company in implementing this program. 
In addition, Bethlehem developed a system of part-time 
employment and a work-sharing program as an alternative to laying 
off workers.  "This made it possible to retain approximately 20,000 
more of our employees than would have been necessary if a favored 
44 
few had been kept for full time activity."   In addition, to avoid 
a massive number of terminations, the company placed some steel 
workers on a waiting list to be called back to work as soon as jobs 
became available; Bethlehem still considered these men its employees. 
In May, 1936, the company created a plan that gave vacations 
41 
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with pay to all eligible employees.  An issue of the Review ex- 
plained the purpose of the plan as such:  "... to five employees 
a stated vacation time with pay, to allow for rest and recreation, 
and in recognition of prompt and regular attendance, and of faith- 
45 
ful, efficient and continuous service."   Under the olan, workers 
with five years of continuous employment received one full week 
of vacation with pay.  The amount of payment was based on an 
average hourly rate determined from hours worked and wages earned 
in the nay neriods beginning and ending in the Mrst nuarter of the 
year. 
Basically, this vacation plan represented both the first 
and last maior accomplishment, in the way of employee related 
benefits, of Bethlehem and its ERP during the 1930's.  The de- 
pression adversely effected the creation of new programs since the 
company did not want to increase its financial burdens.  However, 
the old programs, with the exception of the stock purchase plan, 
continued operation.  Later, Bethlehem and its company union cane 
under a direct attack launched by SWOC and its growing, number of 
followers.  Thus, the company spent a maior part of its time and 
effort defending itself and the legitimacy of its KRP in more ways 
than one. 
After SVOC's creation in 1936, Bethlehem Steel found 
it increasingly necessary to resume an active anti-union campaign 
45 " 
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on both a national and local level.  They stated their full support 
of the views and goals expressed by the American Iron and Steel 
Institute, advertisement which denounced the union and its ob- 
jectives.  Later, Bethlehem let it be known that they strongly 
disapproved of the SWOC-U.S. Steel agreement in 19 37, and vowed to 
continue its anti-union fight along with the rest of Little Steel. 
Although the CTO's success with U.S. Steel gave them an advantage, 
46 
"... their foes quickly mapped out a counter-offensive."   Part 
of Bethlehem's plan included a propaganda campaign aimed directly 
at their own work force.  They used The Bethlehem Review as a tool 
to dissuade workers from any inclination toward outside unionism 
and the closed shop.  Articles in the Review stressed the company's 
preference of the ERP, praised the plans and emphasized its accom- 
plishments.  They always pointed out the ERP's connection with the 
smooth implementation and equitable administration of the plans. 
Therefore, the company seemed to argue, or at least tried to con- 
vince its workers, that the benefits labor received were directly 
related to the ERP's existence.  The ERP was credited with laying 
down the foundations of the new-found friendship between labor and 
management. 
Grace apparently believed that the company union repre- 
sented a valuable weapon in his fight against the closed shop. 
In the Review, he stressed the ERP's effectiveness and the im- 
46 The Bethlehem Globe-Times,   6 March  1937,  p.   1. 
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provements it made in almost every area; "... no question can 
arise between us that cannot be equitably adjusted.  There have been 
no strife or strikes, nor loss of -jobs or time, and no dues or 
47 
fines."   Grace added that this harmonious relationship benefited 
everyone involved: the company, the employees and their families, 
and the community.  However, Grace found it necessary to include a 
warning in his message:  "... anything that disturbs our present 
48 
condition will imperil the interests of all."   Despite this 
warning, Grace seemed convinced, or at least wanted it to appear as 
such, that his employees were satisfied with the ERP and its 
accomplishments and did not want a change.  ITe based this conclusion 
on the lack of strikes and the large number of eligible employees that 
participated in the 1936 ERP election (96.1% voted from amon« the 
49 
53,847 eligible employees).   Therefore, Grace concluded his re- 
marks on a somewhat paternalistic note.  He promised to protect his 
employees from any outside organization that threatened the open shop 
ideal or the continuation of the ERP.  "My purpose rather is to 
assure you that we will assist you in every way to continue the 
present proven method of dealing with our mutual problems, and that 
we will use our resources to the best of our ability to protect you 
and your families from interference, intimidation and coercion from 
47 








-Not long after Grace made this statement, Bethlehem had 
to gather its legal and financial resources to defend itself and 
the ERP in court.  On August 26, 1937, SUOC filed charges of unfair 
labor practices against the company with the NLRB.  In a 1938 issue 
of the Review, Grace stated:  "The Company is defending itself, and 
at a considerable expense, against what we believe to be an un- 
founded charge, . . ., that the Company is dominating your 
51 
collective bargaining Plans."  The Company hired Hovt A. Moore of 
the law firm of Cravath, deGersdorff, Swaine and Wood to conduct 
its defense.  However, the ERP's at all the other Bethlehem plants 
52 
retained their own counsel. 
In 1939, the NLRB ordered Bethlehem to ston interfering 
with the self-organization of its workers and to abolish the 
ERT.  Over the years, Bethlehem had expressed pride and satis- 
faction regarding their role in the development and administration 
of specific plans implemented under their industrial relations 
orogram.  Ironicallv, many of the same factors that made the com- 
pany proud of its ERP also played an important role in the Board's 
decision.  The NLRB pointed out specific instances of company 
domination and interference in the collective bargaining of its 
50 
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employees:  the company initiated, sponsored and determined the 
essential form of the plans; the plans hecame an intepr?] part of 
the business and represented an important policv of the company; 
and through company publications, employees were made aware of the 
company's preference for the ERP and antagonism toward other forms 
of representation.  "By such means as these the Company insured the 
continuance of the effects of its original domination of and inter- 
53 
ference with the formation of the Plans." 
The Board found that the actual structure and operation 
of the plans, "... rendered them peculiarly subject to the 
54 
interference and influence of the employer."   Although employees 
elected their own representatives, the ERP was still incapable of 
functioning as a real bargaining agency for them.  The plan did not 
designate a way for workers to formulate or communicate their de- 
mands cr to instruct and control their representatives. Moreover, 
representatives could not be chosen from outside the company, re- 
gardless of their collective bargaining capabilities.  Thus, the 
NLRB concluded that Bethlehem's ERP did not serve at the will of 
its employees nor did it represent the self-organization of the 
workers as stipulated under the Wagner Act. 
Before the NLRB's fateful decision, the ERP flourished 
53 
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for ouite some time at Bethlehem Steel.  Actually, how effective 
was the ERP in the eyes of Bethlehem's own emnlovees?  Did the 
company and the ERP comprehend the needs and demands of its work 
force, thus enabling their to implement effective plans?  Or did 
the company union exist just to appease the workers, create a 
false atmosphere of good will and suppress any worker demands for 
outside unionism?  If the ERP really provided for the needs of 
Bethlehe^m's employees, not iust expressed them on paper, would 
SWOC have gained any momentum and increased their membership there? 
How did Bethlehem's labor force view their own company union and 
their representatives? 
Bethlehem's employees had a chance to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the ERP and to participate in the democratic 
process of selecting their representatives; they only had to cast 
their ballots for the man of their choice when the elections took 
place.  However, many steel workers had grown dissatisfied with 
the companv union since its creation in 1919 and the beoinninc of 
SWOC's organizing- drive in 1936.  Rome workers refused to even vote 
in the ERP elections.  And by 1941, the pro-unionists at Bethlehem 
waited anxiously for the company to comply with the NLRB order to 
disband the ERP.  These attitudes were suggestive of widespread 
dissatisfaction with and disappointment in the ERP. 
Looking back from the 1970's, Bethlehem's pensioners 
expressed divergent views about the ERP and its effectiveness, but 
83 
most believed it to be "useless."  Most of the pro-union people 
viewed the ERP with contempt because its very existence seemed to 
deny them the rights and privileges that an independent union 
could afford then.  Many of the workmen interviewed supported 
ST'TOC rather than the comnanv union for what thev themselves termed 
"valid reasons."  They agreed with the NLRB that the ERP was com- 
pany dominated thus rendering it ineffective and unable to 
represent labor sufficiently enough to penerate the desired changes 
and objectives.  A few men even referred to the ERP, most graphically, 
as a "Charlie McCarthy" or "April Fool's" union; meaning that the 
ERP was a puppet, a fake and a joke.  To these men, the company 
union failed to produce any satisfactory benefits or actual changes 
in working conditions.  Moreover, they staunchly believed that the 
elected representatives did not adequately portray labor's atti- 
tudes and sentiments. 
As one man explained about the ERP, "... grievances 
were never really listened to.  You couldn't really complain. 
55 
Representatives did nothing.  It was like it didn't even exist." 
Lewis Kozo, at one time an ERP representative, recalled that 
management representatives talked a lot during the meetings but 
never really solved the problems that arose.  Kozo stated that, 
... if you complained about a foreman, he got the raise and you 
Peter Kalman, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Mindy K. Small at United Steel Workers of America, 
Bethlehem, 21 July 1975. 
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56 
lost vour -job."   John Vadolnev, nresentlv a union official, 
felt strongl" that, ". . .it was a disgrace to even call the Lnp 
57 
a union because it wasn't."   And then there was Victor Kennint? 
who expressed pride and satisfaction that he refrained from 
voting in any ERP election.  Henning recalled that, "... the 
first time I ever voted was for the CIO to represent the 
„
58 
company.    Thus, for Henning, it took the CIO, not the ERP, to 
inspire and compell him to vote. 
Marcus Kalasz, another retired steel worker, seemed 
confident that, bv 1.941, Bethlehem's ERP had finally reached its 
fateful demise.  Kalasz commented that: 
The union was on the wav in and the ERP on the 
way out.  A different and better union was coming 
and it can't [sic] be stopped.  Washington and 
the NLRB are bigger than the company and they 
can't [sic] be stopped.  59 
Thus, the pro-unionists interviewed rendered the company union 
ineffective and felt its demise inevitable as labor pushed and 
shoved its way to power and respectability through industrial 
unionism with the backing of the federal government. 
Lewis Kozo, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal interview 
with Kathy Munley, 7 April 1975. 
John Wadolney, Hellertown, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Kathy Munley, 11 March 1975. 
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Victor Henninp, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Kathy Munlev, 15 April 1975. 
59 
Marcus Kalasz, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Mindy K. Small at United Steel Workers of America, 
Bethlehem, 21 July 1975. 
The ERP bailed to nrovi/'e the security and protection 
the. workers needed and demanded.  The pro-unionists perceived 
the company union as a facade established to nlacate the workers; 
a plan that looked relatively worthwhile on paper t;o business and 
management but did nothing substantial eor   labor in actuality. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the previous statement made by Marcus 
Kalasz, many pro-union men felt secure in their evaluation and 
estimation of Bethlehem's FPP because or   the similar attitudes 
expressed by and the support of the federal (government and the 
NLRB on this issue.  The continued sunport of the government and 
the obvious legitimacy that support afforded labor's cause, meant 
a lot to the pro-union forces and probably added quite significantly 
to their strength in numbers. 
Ironically, many of the anti-union men involved expressed 
similar sentiments regarding the usefulness and effectiveness of 
Bethlehem's ERP.  However, their observations and criticism did 
not seem as harsh.  The anti-unionists, for the most part, agreed 
that the ERP was inefficient and many of its representatives in- 
60 
competent and thus, failed to represent labor effectively.   This 
group also pointed out that the ERP failed to provide adequate 
benefits and raises for the workers.  Only tvro of the men interviewed, 
61 
Harvey Hoffert and Michael Kendzierski,   participated in the corn- 
Harvey Hoffert, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Mindy K. Small, 16 July 1975. 
Interview with Harvey Hoffert and Michael Kendzierski, 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal interview with Mindy K. Small, 
13 August 1975. 
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pany'.s stock purchase plan which they considered a relatively good 
investment.  They both recalled money deducted from their pay- 
checks for the stock, however, thev differed over the amount. 
One man, however, found the ERP worthwhile and con- 
sidered it the best means for procuring the goals and obiectives 
inherent in the idea of unionism.  William Smith, at one time an 
ERP representative, expressed a sense of bitterness, frustration 
and even sadness that the steel workers refused to give the company 
union a fair chance.  "Change took time.  It couldn't come over- 
62 
night but the men didn't see this.  The ERP was the workers' union." 
Smith firmly believed that the goals of the ERP equaled that of 
SWOC's and he felt it only n matter of time before the company union 
accomplished many of these objectives.  Smith also claimed that 
SWOC men only wanted to strike, not work. 
Another retired steel worker expressed contempt for the 
idea of unionism altogether, whether it was company or independently 
63 
inspired.    He disapproved of and highly criticized both the ERP 
and the CIO, and in doing so, probably relayed the sentiments of a 
whole other group of anti-union workers. 
William Smith failed to recognize an important noint in 
his evaluation of that period and the tensions surrounding the EET>. 
62 
William Smith, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Steven W. Bates, 8 May 1975. 
63 
John Check, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal interview 
with Mindy K. Small, 15 July, 1975. 
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♦ 
Smith believed that his fellow workers did not p.ive the ERP enouph 
time to accomplish its oblectives before they rendered it totally 
useless.  However, Bethlehem's ERP began operation in 1919 and it 
did not encounter any viable competition or real opposition until 
the creation of SV70C in 1936.  Before the advent of SWOC, the 
workers had no other alternative than to place all their faith in 
the company union and hope for the best.  But in the final analysis, 
the ERP failed to produce satisfactory results; the results needed 
to sustain the loyalty and support of the steel workers it repre- 
sented.  Thus, the continued existence of the ERP was threatened 
by the advance of SWOC. 
88 
Chapter V 
SWOC and Bethlehem ' s Employees 
In 1941, SWOC resumed an active organizing drive.  This 
time they decided to focus all their attention and effort around 
the largest of the Little Steel firms, the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation.  The actual organization of this company was imnor- 
tant to SWOC for various reasons.  First, SWOC could not afford 
another major defeat such as the one encountered in the 1937 Little 
Steel strike.  In order to maintain sufficient morale and a 
constant influx of new memhershin, the union needed continued 
success or, at least, steady progress in their organizing efforts. 
To accomplish their ultimate objectives, it was imperative that 
SWOC keep up momentum and remain active.  Thus, SWOC recognized 
the necessity of making a concerted effort in their drive against 
Bethlehem and, if possible, to effect an immediate settlement 
there.  Second, an immediate agreement was important because the 
i 
probability of another world war threatened to postpone labor's 
union struggle indefinitely.  Third, regarding the war issue, 
public opinion might turn against labor if their activities in- 
creased and intensified at a particularly sensitive and dangerous 
time, a time of war preparedness.  The public already had con- 
flicting opinions on whether or not labor had the right to pre- 
89 
cipitate, conflicts that might interfere with needed steel production. 
Last, Bethlehem Steel represented one of the staunchest nnti-union 
companies within the Little Steel croup.  A victory there, SWOC 
thought, would certainly spread to other American steel producers 
because of that company's power and influence. 
In order to meet the challenge of its renewed camoaign, 
the union created a special Bethlehem Steel Organizing Committee 
and placed Van A. Bittner in charge of the operation.  They then 
proceeded with an intense drive to gain new members into their 
ranks.  By 1941, SWOC had gained considerable headway in their 
membership drive at Bethlehem.  Obviously, as SWOC strengthened 
their campaign there, a decision on this matter, one way or 
another, weighed heavily on the minds of Bethlehem's emplovees. 
Those that actually joined SWOC mentioned a number of things 
that directly influenced their personal decisions.  Who were these 
men and what were their reasons for becoming active unionists? 
The idea of unionism meant different tilings to many 
people and those that supported its advancement did so for various 
reasons.  However, the reason mentioned most often centered around 
the attainment of security and protection in their daily worhinn 
conditions.  To many steel workers the word security involved such 
issues as seniority, health and death benefits, decent wa^es, better 
and safer working conditions, vacations and equal representation. 
A number of pro-union men were convinced that these goals could only 
be achieved through collective action.  For example, Herbert Sechler, 
90 
a nachinist, believed that the union was necessary and nersonalh' 
pot involved because, "... men have to st:fch together to tpt 
1 
anything done; individual effort is no ?ood ." 
A union, through collective action and group identifica- 
tion, would Rive individual workers strength and confidence In 
numbers.  Moreover, a union would allow men to meet the day-to-day 
challenge of comnanv foremen and supervisors on much more than a 
subordinate level.  The benefits of a union, specifically those of 
security and protection, nut the worker on a somewhat equal ^ootino 
with their bosses. 
Another retired steel worker, J. David Hachain, 
described in his ox-rn words what the union ideal meant to himself 
and manv of his fellow workers. 
Union men stuck to an ideal—believed union 
good because man is entitled to a decent wage 
to provide for his family.  Unless man feels 
free, he can't live.  This is an ideal; it's 
good for us.  We believe in living the company 
a dav's work for a day's pav, but the company 
didn't want to give it.  We had an ideal and we 
lived for that.  2 
Cloals and ideals such as these existed for many of the men employed 
at Bethlehem Steel.  SWOC represented and expressed many of the same 
ambitions and objectives the steel workers themselves dreamed of. 
Herbert Sechler, Richlandtown, Pennsylvania, persona] 
interview with Kathy Munley, 10 March 1975. 
2 
J. David Machain, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Mindv K. Small at United Steel Workers of America, 
Bethlehem, 21 July 1975. 
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Thus, manv men decided to take, a chance, lav their *obs on the line 
and ioin SWOC's ranks. 
To some, the idea of unionism, an old one, represented 
a tradition passed down from generation to veneration ?nonc manv 
steel working families.  Within their individual families, some 
steel workers represented a second and sometimes even a third 
generation of employment at Bethlehem.  Some men recounted stories 
told to them by their relatives (in most cases, fathers' or ^rand- 
bathers') concerning their experiences with the company and their 
attitude towards unionism.  In many instances, the traditional 
attitudes and experiences of relatives directly influenced the course 
of action taken by a particular steel worker, brought up in this 
kind of atmosphere, regarding his own union affiliations and 
activities. 
One man, Victor Henning, started his career at Bethlehem 
Steel with an unusual nurpose in mind.  He admitted takinp the iob 
with the hone of someday getting back at the company for their 
harsh treatment of his father.  Pennine recalled the abuae his 
father experienced when he was laid-off from work just prior to his 
retirement with no pension.  For Henning, his activities as a union 
organizer represented a perfect vehicle for seeking revenge.  "It 




Interview with Victor Hennin?. 
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Another ?,xoun of steel workers related ■ to a total-lv- 
different series of experiences during their youth which led to 
their pro-union sympathies.  Many o^ these men had fathers that 
tool active roles in previous attempts to unionize the steel in- 
dustry.  They exnressed that this left a deep emotional imnrint on 
their own lives and influenced their individual roles in future. 
union drives.  For example, Owen Mc^adden claimed he was brought 
un in a union family.  He remembered his father's advice, "If vou 
4 
have to be anvthing, be a union man."  Thus, a few of Bethlehem's 
employees had acnuired a great deal of knowledge and experience 
regarding the meaning of unionism through previous exposure at a 
rather early ape.  They carried their impressions with them until 
circumstances forced them to define the importance of unionism to 
themselves.  For some of these men, their onlv alternative was to 
join SWOC and work toward the unionization of Bethlehem Steel. 
Other steel workers were favorably influenced toward 
unionism more bv their own personal working experiences at 
Bethlehem.  Manv of these men mentioned that they encountered 
i 
abusive treatment by company foremen and supervisors during their 
term of employment.  The}' came to the realization that onlv an 
independent union of their own choosing, this time represented by 
SWOC, would bring a halt to this kind of behavior.  On this 
4 
Owen McFadden, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Kathy Munley, 17 March 1975. 
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particular Issue, Peter Kalman remarked that, "T was a unior nan ;>e- 
5 
cause of abuse."  Kalman then explained in his own words the i ind 
of despair and frustration manv steel workers experienced. 
You had no rights, you couldn't say anything; 
it was a continual hassle.  It's like your 
mother and father continuallv heating you. 
Must T live with this all the time?  I've t-ot 
to pet out from under this whipping!  6 
(Throughout the interview, Mr. Kalman always related his experiences 
and feelings by using graphic analogies such as the one above.  They 
helped to explain the actual stress and tension many workers faced 
in their everyday dealings with the company and their bosses.  More- 
over, his vivid descriptions produced a greater awareness, at least 
on the part of the interviewer, of the intensity of the situation 
which eventually forced many steel workers into the pro-union 
camp).  Without a union of their own choice, the workers at 
Bethlehem had no real protection and had to succumb to all kinds of 
abusive treatment - for fear of losing their -jobs. 
A number of Bethlehem's foremen, through oppression and 
intimidation, made many steel workers feel totally worthless and 
inferior. Mitchell Schaeffer, an electric welder, recalled many 
instances when foremen used bad language when talking to their men. 
He even remembered a few incidents where foremen resorted to physical 
force to get the men to do what they told them to.  Sometimes, they 




actually kicked the" workers around to ret "them to work.  Schaeffcr 
then added, "It was degrading."   Lewis Kozo recalled one forppan 
commenting something like, "dogs could be trained hut workers 
a 
can't."   This hind of treatment left a deep psvchological imprint 
on many workers, whether they experienced this themselves or 
watched it happening to others. 
Other steel workers criticized foremen for nressurine 
the men to perform constantly without a let-up.  One man believed 
that this kind of attitude and behavior made many of his fellow 
workers bitter.  Francis Vadasz recalled some foremen being "rough1' 
and "tough," driving some men hard, while showinp favoritism to 
9 
others by giving them easier jobs and lighter work loads.   These 
actions alienated a large part of Bethlehem's labor force and made 
many men hostile toward the company and their bosses.  Ultimately, 
this forced manv steel workers Into the pro-union camp and into 
active unionist positions. 
It is important to note why these men tended to tolerate 
their situation rather than quit and seek employment elsewhere. 
For the most part, Bethlehem Steel represented the only major source 
of employment in the area and manv men onlv felt qualified doing 
7 
Mitchell Schaeffer, Allentown, Pennsylvania, personal 
interview with Kathy Munley, 16 April 1975. 
8 
Interview with Lewis Kozo. 
9 
Francis Vadasz, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Kathy Munley, 17 March 1975. 
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that particular kind of work.  Brit "mostly, the men -just mentioned 
the resnon^ibilitv to feed and clothe their families as the nrirc 
reason for putting up with mistreatment and abuse from their 
bosses and the frustration and dissatisfaction resulting from it. 
One retired steel worker described the situation rather graphically. 
The -job was like pulling teeth.  You get up in 
the morning and have a toothache.  You hated to 
go to work because of the abuse you were sub- 
jected to.  Someone beating you on the back all 
the time but you had to do it because of family 
responsibilities.  10 
For many of these men, the union represented a positive 
force; it offered a way out of their dilemma.  A union allowed them 
to stand up for their rights without fear of losing their jobs; 
again, through collective action and group identification, individual 
workers gained the necessary strength and confidence to continue 
working in a hostile environment.  After /joining SWOC and fighting 
for a cause thev believed in, manv workers regained their self- 
confidence and pride which enabled them to meet the day-to-day 
challenge of their bosses on much more than a subordinate level. 
Moreover, a union meant that they would have a larger more nowerful 
organization to continue to protect and secure their rights in the 
future, regardless of the prevailing economic or nolitical atmosphere, 
More specificially, many pro-unionists expounded on the 
kind of hardships they faced in their daily working experience or 
10 
Interview with Peter Kalman. 
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else they recalled the burden?; of others.  Rasicallv, the nroMers 
discussed most often centered around the difficultv thev encountered 
in -just communicating or petting along with their foremen.  This 
created an antagonistic atmosphere which forced some nen to change 
jobs or departments several tines.  John Vadolnev, a machinist, 
recalled workers being either threatened or fired for just smoking 
11 
a cigarette.   Other men cited the same incidence and felt the 
punishment rather drastic for, what they considered, a minor in- 
fraction.  However, most of them concluded that it was just one 
example of the typical absurd policies carried out by certain 
malevolent foremen. 
Peter Kalman, also a machinist, believed he experienced 
prejudicial treatment because of his political affiliations. 
Specificallv, Kalman recalled, this occurred during the 1936 
Presidential election when he supported Roosevelt over Alfred 
Landon.  Kalman's foreman questioned him about his politics, 
disagreed with the answers he received and then penalized him, a 
\ week off with no nay, for it.  Kalman stated that all his dealings 
wit?i foremen created a lot of difficulty and unnecessary problems; 
they could never pet along.  He also mentioned that foremen always 
assigned him the worst jobs available and many times his bosses 
12 
held him responsible for the mistakes of others. 
Interview with John Wadolney. 
12 
Interview with Peter Kalman. 
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Other steel workers had similar experiences with their 
foremen.  J. David Machain, a craneman, liked his -job for the most 
part hut complained about being forced at times to do^the work of 
others when they made mistakes.  Marcus Kalasz was told to work the 
crane one afternoon, even though he had no orior technical training 
in how to operate it.  Kalasz refused because of the obvious danger 
involved and the next dav he received a nenaltv of a dav off with 
no pay.  Thus, all these man encountered abusive treatment from 
their bosses which helped shape their pro-union attitudes and 
their eventual active roles as union organizers. 
The men holding pro-union sympathies blamed the company 
and its policies for forcing the union issue on many of its 
employees.  Company policy forced men into active unionist 
13 
positions; "forced it down their throats,"  as one man put it. 
The workers cited several specific abuses in this regard.  First, 
the company's hiring practices seemed, at times, unreasonable and 
unfair.  Friends and relatives of men in high places (men with the 
pox<7er and position to effect such decisions) got -jobs while others 
stood outside the gates for months iust waiting for work. 
Another man expressed his resentment toward the company's 
hiring practices in somewhat exaggerated and fictitious terms. 




town.  They, hired only farmers and rural people.  Tt was an easy 
14 
set uo for the company; always had a work force."   This   statement 
revealed an animositv toward Fennsvlvania Dutch workers that was 
also expressed by others during interview sessions.  As they ex- 
plained it, the Pennsylvania Dutch seemed to Rain employment at 
Bethlehem more readilv than any other group.  Many pro-unionists 
explained their observations regarding this natter by pointing out 
that most Pennsylvania Dutch were farmers.  Therefore, they had easy 
access to such things as chickens and vegetables which could be 
used to bribe foremen for jobs.  In addition, the Dutch tended to 
remain staunch anti-unionists throughout the organizing struggle 
at Bethlehem.  Thus, the favoritism shown through the company's 
hiring practices affected the attitudes of some men toward the 
company itself and ultimately influenced their feelings toward the 
union. 
Second, complaints centered around the practices of 
company foremen.  In this category, however, most union men re- 
called that dishonest foremen took bribes of food, cigarettes and 
money in return for better /jobs, especially during the depression 
period.  Peter Kalman, along with many others, remembered that fore- 
men gave good jobs to their "buddies." 
However, a few men did recognize that foremen also had 




to produce.  The.v believed that this is what actual lv caused fore- 
men to be rough at times on their men.  Mitchell Schaeffer commented 
on this issue that, "... they feared for their Jobs too.  They 
had to produce so they pushed the men.  There were other men alwavs 
15 
waiting to get their jobs."   However, manv workers refused to 
grant concessions to foremen even on these grounds.  They strongly 
believed that there was absolutely no excuse for their behavior. 
Third, dangerous working conditions, low wages, lone 
hours and virtually no benefits or protection for the vorkinrrman 
created a tense and hostile environment.  Men reported working 
under either verv hot or cold weather conditions and thev recalled 
some men passing out from the intense heat caused by the process of 
steel production itself.  Others remarked about the poor sanitary 
conditions with few showers or bathrooms and no specifically 
designated area to eat lunch.  According to the pro-unionists inter- 
viewed, the company seemingly had no intention whatsoever of 
changing these unfair practices and unsafe conditions; a problem 
that had plagued labor constantly since the dawn of the industrial 
revolution.  This kind of realization, alons with each individual's 
daily working experience, pushed manv of Bethlehem's employees fur- 
ther and further into the pro-union camp. 
Those that sided with the union and eventually joined 
SWOC's ranks did so with the expressed purpose of gaining for 
15,. 
Interview with Mitchell Schaeffer. 
ion 
themselves and others like then the security and orotection needed 
while working in the plant.  Their dally working experiences and 
their relationships with their bosses and the companv itself forced 
them to seek external means to achieve their desired objectives. 
To them, SWOC seemed the only answer available at that time.  There- 
fore, these men -joined ur> and became active organizers in the fight 
for union recognition. 
Of those interviewed, most joined SWOC around 1937 and 
became organizers shortly thereafter.  Victor Henning showed pride 
in the fact that he was the thirteenth man to join SWOC in Bethlehem 
and that he distinguished himself by signing un more new members in 
16 
one day, thirty-seven, than any other union organizer.   The 
organizers had various jobs to perform for the union.  Their duties 
ranged from signing up new members and collecting one dollar in dues 
from each new person joining, to handing out leaflets outside the 
plant gates as workmen changed shifts.  Besides their regular jobs, 
their daily union activities kept these men relativelv busy. 
In many instances, active organizing on company property 
proved dangerous since Bethlehem had forbidden such action.  As 
one retired organizer and steel worker put it, " . . .if they 
caught you, they discharged you.  If you were a union man they'd 
17 
find some way to get rid of you."   Many times union meetings had 
16 
Interview with Victor Henning. 
Nicholas Kiak, Hellertown, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Kathy Munley, 2 April 1975. 
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to be held in secret places, such as the homes and cellars of 
union members.  Basically, most of the nro-SWOC men feared being 
fired if they gained reputations as unionists.  Some organizers 
recalled making contacts with individual steel workers before and 
after shifts and many times in plant washrooms or during lunch 
breaks.  Moreover, most men refrained from wearing SWOC and CIO 
identification buttons and badges for fear of being reprimanded or 
even fired.  There were some, however, like Marcus Kalasz, who 
onenlv defied the company's anti-union policies and proudly dis- 
played their CIO buttons while on coronanv property. 
SWOC's organizing strategy included going door-to-door 
to convince, what they termed, "middle-of-the-roaders" to join the 
union.  In addition, the local union held mass meetings, picnics 
and rallies for the purpose of organizing and increasing S"OC's 
membership.  One retired steel worker and organizer, Francis Vadasz, 
recalled never being at home because he constantly attended union 
meetings and events.  Vadasz continued that, "... wives of 
18 
organizers were called CIO widows,"  because their husbands were 
very rarely at home. 
Many of SWOC's known organizers at Bethlehem encountered 
threats and/or punishment from foremen or supervisors because of 
their union affiliations and activities. As they recalled, the com- 
pany tried to coerce some men to drop out of the union, "... but 
18 
Interview with Francis Vadasz. 
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19 
we hunt' on,"   said Oven Mc^adden.  ^n^e wnrVers rnceived penalties 
(usually time off with no pay) and still otliers faced more diffi- 
cult or tedious jobs.  The company even discharged none men entirely 
or for an unspecified period of time for their union ties.  Two men 
interviewed were actually fired from the company and both mentioned 
being "blackballed" and unable to obtain similar work anywhere 
else.  One man was eventually rehired, however, the other worker 
20 
was not as successful. 
Many pro-unionists never faced threats or punishments 
themselves but recalled others that did.  Some supervisors called 
known union men into the office every day to reprimand them and 
tried to dissuade them from continuing their union activities. 
Many times, foremen resorted to name calling, threats and bribes 
in order to produce the results they wanted.  They referred to the 
CIO and SWOC as a bunch of "gangsters."  In some cases, supervisors 
actually told men to get out of the union or they would find them- 
selves in deep trouble. Marcus Kalasz recalled a rather strange 
experience he encountered.  On his way home from work one night, 
he was followed by, what he termed, "... gangsters hired by the 
21 
company."   Kalasz believed that the purpose behind this action was 
obvious.  The company honed to scare and intimidate him right out of 
19 
Interview with Owen McFadden. 
20 
Interview with Peter Kalman and Victor Henning. 
21 
Interview with Marcus Kalasz. 
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the union.  Another retired steel worker was offered a more 
positive reinforcement.  His boss hoped to bribe him with a 
promotion to foreman.  However, the terms of the offering were 
the same as usual; he had to Rive up all his union and organizing 
activities.  The anti-union tactics of Bethlehem Steel were so 
intense that even some pro-union immigrant employees of the company 
stated that they experienced more nrejudicial treatment because of 
their union affiliations and organizing activities than as foreigners, 
However, according to the men interviewed, the company's methods 
failed to bring the desired results.  At least all the men involved 
in this study, refused the company's offers and ignored, as best 
they could, their harassments. 
Surprisingly, many of the nro-unionists interviewed had 
no animosity toward Bethlehem Steel and retained many pleasant 
memories about their employment there.  As James Dugan put it, 
"Bethlehem Steel took care of me when I got sick . . . and T made 
22 
a good living there."   Dugan then added a critical comment about 
the firm; "... the company made too much money and the workers 
23 
not enough.  It should have been more evenly distributed."   Louis 
Goldberg, a nro-union man, but one that was hired after the union 
question was resolved, stated that, "The company was good to me and 
22 
James Dugan, Bethlehem, 'Pennsylvania, personal interview 




I had an obligation to them.  It was the greatest industry and 
24 
fair with its nen." 
Many of the steel workers agreed that their jobs at 
Bethlehem enabled them to obtain the material pleasures they wanted 
most out of life.  The ones mentioned most often included homes, 
cars and higher education for their children.  Nicholas Kiak believed 
that the company never really bothered him or nave him any trouble 
25 
in any way, "... even as a union man."   However, Kiak, in 
analyzing comnany policy, believed Bethlehem made a mistake by 
waiting too long to implement specific benefits and reforms, "... 
26 
otherwise, they might have defeated the union." 
However, other pro-union men remained hostile to the 
company right un until the present,  Peter Kalman was one of these 
men.  TTe resented the company's flagrant violation of the law. 
"The company violated the Wagner Act.  They didn't care about the 
27 
law.  They dictated their own policies."   Marcus Kalasz agreed 
with Kalman's assessment and added that, "A lot of crooked things 
went on.  They didn't care if you starved to death.  The men were 
treated bad.  The Company cut prices of jobs, never raised them. 
24 
Louis Goldberg, Hellertown, Pennsylvania, personal 
interview with Mindy K. Small, 14 August 1975. 
25 




Interview with Peter Kalman. 
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28 
You have, to fight like hell for a Denny,... one-rusty penny." 
All of the nro-union men interviewed refused to give 
un their role in SUCC's organizing campaign.  They all demonstrated 
threat pride and satisfaction in what they fJnallv participated in 
accomplishing—the unionization of one of America's staunchest antd- 
union steel corporations, Bethlehem Steel.  Their dissatisfactions 
with existing conditions, their desire to brJnp about immediate and 
effective change without waiting for the firm to do so on its own, 
and their prior influences and backgrounds related to unionism led 
these men toward collective action in order to successfully execute 
their objectives. 
All of Bethlehem's employees felt the effects of SWOC's 
organizing campaign in one way or another.  The attitudes and 
reactions of individual steel workers regarding the union nuestion, 
however, varied greatly.  Many workers staunchly opposed SWOC, 
refused to -join its ranks and voiced their defiance to the union's 
organizing campaign.  However, the interviews conducted with anti- 
union men revealed some irony in the whole affair.  Tt was not that 
they objected to the union's ideals of protection and security, 
better and safer working conditions, higher wages and improved 
benefits.  In fact, most of these men expressed the exact same 
goals and desires.  Their major complaint, however, centered around 
the scare tactics practiced by the union organizers in attracting 
28 
Interview with Marcus Kalasz. 
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new .membership, the implementing; of strikes and demonstrations 
to bring about union recognition, and the violence and destruction 
that usually accompanied them. 
Moreover, many of the anti-unionists blamed the violence 
and destruction that developed during the strike periods on outside 
?<*itators or radicals brought in by the union for that expressed 
purpose.  On this particular issue, it was difficult to determine 
how many of these men were actually influenced by the company's 
anti-union propaganda.  Kany of the complaints lodged against the 
union and its tactics, by this particular group of retired steel 
workers, closely resembled the same points stressed by the industry 
in its effort to dissuade labor fror being enticed into the union 
movement.  To what extent these anti-unionists could support their 
claims regarding outside agitators or reveal the source of their 
information, remained unanswered.  However, there was no doubt 
that they held unyielding positions concerning their attitudes 
toward SWOC and the methods employed by the union to achieve their 
ends.  Bruce Steinbecker, a precision grinder, nut it bluntly when 
29 
he stated, "I just can't tolerate it." 
Another anti-unionist, William Smith, expressed hostility 
toward those of his fellow workers that had taken up the union's 
cause and ioined SWOC.  Throuph his close observations, Smith 
29 
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lurrmed them all together in one group and generally concluded that 
union men always caused trouble and complained about everything. 
In his opinion, ..."... they were just bums.  They were the 
30 
lousiest guys.  They wouldn't work." 
It must be mentioned that manv anti-unionists had a 
difficult time during this period.  They also experienced bitterness, 
frustration and antagonism at work.  These feelings increased as 
the organizing drive intensified at Bethlehem and more of their 
fellow workers began to openly support SWOC.  Moreover, as SWOC 
gained momentum and numerical strength at Bethlehem, anti-unionists 
were easier to identify and it became an increasingly uimonn] -ir 
position to hold.  For example, Michael Kendzierski revealed durinp 
the interview that he eventually signed with the union out of 
frustration and intimidation, not from personal choice.  "I didn't 
like the union but if you didn't sign they'd laugh at you and call 
31 
you names."   Thus, both pro-union and anti-union men alike faced 
a hostile working environment at Bethlehem Steel during SWOC'3 
struggle for recognition.  Steel workers spli(t off into different 
groups according to their sentiments which created a tense and 
frustrating atmosphere in the plant. 
Some anti-unionists concurred with the statements issued 
30 
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by SWOC organizers, that in many instances workers refused to join 
the union for fear of losing their jobs.  Thus, the comnnnv's tactics 
seemed as much in question by some non-union men as the union's did 
to others.  Ironically, fear of losing one's job was one of the prime 
arguments listed by pro-unionists for taking just that position. 
Could it be that these anti-unionists had different daily experiences 
on the job when dealing with foremen and management?  Did they en- 
counter more tolerance and autonomy while doing their work? The pro- 
union elements expressed a fear of losing their jobs on a daily 
basis regardless of their union affiliation.  However, this was not 
the case with the anti-union men interviewed. 
Most of the anti-union men involved mentioned having a 
relativelv good relationship with their foremen.  Rut most important, 
they recalled having a reasonable amount of autonomy in their daily 
working activities.  For the most part, they were not intimidated or 
made to feel inferior by their bosses.  As one man put it, "no bosses 
32 
ever bothered me."   Thus, this grout) did not experience abusive 
treatment, whether it be psychological or physical in nature, 
throughout their term of employment at Bethlehem.  Moreover, these 
men sincerely felt that their jobs would only be in danger if they 
did something the company would disapprove of; specifically, joining 
the union. Many anti-unionists refused to take any chances of losing 




clothing their families.  Again, nanv steel vo-H-prs mentioned this 
as an imnortant influence on their decision to loin S'.'PC.  Vniv did 
the anti-unionists refuse to follow the same course of action?  Toth 
sides, at least on this noint, ."Seemed to have the same objective in 
mind . 
Manv anti-union men retained other objections to unionism 
and SWOC in particular. A few of them mentioned that they saw STOC 
as an organization out for itself, not For everyone else as they 
claimed. One man even objected to the idea of union dues being ex- 
tracted from his paycheck. Moreover, he sincerely believed that the 
companv was headed in the same direction as the union on issues re- 
garding benefits, wages, and working conditions.  He showed confidence 
in Bethlehem and felt that improvements seemed forthcoming in almost 
33 
every area; "... they weren't so rough anv more."   Some of the 
other retired men in this group agreed with these conclusions. 
In addition, all of the anti-union men interviewed ex- 
pressed satisfaction with and gratitude toward their emnloyer. 
Basically, they cited only admirable traits and qualities when 
they referred to Bethlehem.  They truly believed it was their good 
fortune to obtain employment there and if the opportunity arose they 
would choose the same jobs again.  As they explained it, the comnanv 
took care of them, treated them fairly and enabled them to make a 





remarked that,.". . . it was a nice cnmranv to vorJ- for."    Bruce 
Steinbecker added that, "The cormany doesn't cut vour throat.  Tliev 
35 
take care of vou."    Steinbecker was satisfied with his work an 1 
the company because it allowed him to obtain the things he desired 
most out of life with only an eighth grade education. 
Some of Bethlehem's employees managed to remain in- 
different to the union question for various reasons.  In this cate- 
gory two men and their working experiences stood out the most, 
Herman Schneider and Heorge Dancho.  Herman Schneider, a retired 
welder, loved his job tremendously.  Basically, he felt free to use 
his ingenuity to make the job easier, safer and more efficient. 
He mentioned that foremen never interfered with his work and they 
gave him recognition for the work he accomplished.  Schneider 
claimed that his ambition, his desire to advance, left him little 
time to dedicate to union activities or to associate with his 
fellow emplovees.  Thus, he devoted all his time and interest to 
his job and refrained from any kind of union involvements.  Schneider 
gained pride and satisfaction from his job and seemed grateful to 
Bethlehem for everything.  He commented that if the opportunity 
arose or if he had it all to do over again he would still seek employ- 
ment there.  However, Schneider mentioned had working conditions, low 
34 
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wages, poor hiring practices and a few nersonal disappointments of 
his own but he trusted the company entirely when the" promised 
improvements.  But lie also recognized the need for a union and 
approved of their goals and obiectives.  But for him, there was 
no time to pet involved in such matters.  Schneider's priority 
centered around his welding job, the creativity and pride it 
36 
afforded, and the opportunity for advancement. 
George Dancho hated the idea of work but worked because 
of family responsibilities.  He claimed to be motivated only by 
money, yet he also refused to work so hard that he would "kill 
himself."  He had good and bad relationships with his foremen, de- 
pending on the time, the foreman and the circumstances.  Dancho 
also referred to poor hiring practices, an unsuccessful ERP and bad 
working conditions at Bethlehem.  However, Dancho stood behind the 
company all the wav.  "You can't beat the Steel.  If anyone says 
different, they are lying.  They paid good and took care of you. 
37 
Never bite the hand that feeds you."   He stood virtuallv in the 
middle on the union question.  "The union and the Steel are both 
wrong but it balances out.  One has to watch the other.  You can't 
38 
believe either the Steel or the union all of the time."   To Dancho, 
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his spare tine, bin time away from wort and Betbleheir., seemed 
more important than anything else, including, his -Job and the 
union. He onlv wanted to enlov life to the fullest before he 
died. 
Thus, the men who remained indifferent to the union 
nuestion were neither for or against the company or the union 
specifically.  Their allegiance and dedication were more or less 
in themselves—doing whatever they could to advance their own 
particular goals and ambitions, different as they were, regardless 
of the company or the union. 
One man, John Whitney, refrained from -joining SWOC 
because he refused to be nushed into anything and be also dis- 
liked SWOC's tactics in this regard.  But Whitney did not feel 
any devotion to the company either, only to himself.  "To hell 
39 
with the comnany and the union.  I'm for myself."   Whitney ex- 
pressed concern that a worker needed orotection from both 
Bethlehem Steel and his fellow workers.  For this man, his sense 
of individualism outweighed all other considerations. 
All those interviewed, whether oro-union, anti-union 
or indifferent to the union struggle, testify to the actual 
events that took nlace at Bethlehem in 1941 when SWOC renewed 
their organizational drive there.  The ongoing orocess of SWOC's 
39 
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drive forced the steel workers to naVe p  more definite decision— 
to take a stand either way—as to what their nersonal role in the 
larper union movement would be.  Their attitudes toward both the 
companv and the union and their dailv working experiences affected 
their decisions tremendously.  Many workers had nreviously joined 
the union during SWOC's drive between 1936-1937 at Bethlehem. 
Still others took their stand at a more immediate or Dressing time, 
forced on them by snecific events taking shape at Bethlehem in 
1941; events that were important to the total picture of American 
labor history and more specifically to the unionization of the 
entire steel industry.  The story regarding Bethlehem Steel 




SWOC and Bethlehem Stee; 
The federal government and the nation in general worried 
about potential labor strife and struggles resulting in strikes. 
More specifically, strikes would close down America's mass production 
industries at a time when uninterrupted production, especially steel 
production, proved vital to maintain the Defense Department's rearma- 
ment program.  In a report, published in 1941, called "Labor and 
National Defense," Dr. Lloyd G. Reynolds, associate in political 
economv at Johns Honkins University, concluded that strikes would 
probably increase in the near future for a number of reasons. 
Reynolds  included in his deductions the probability of rising con- 
sumer goods prices, larger industrial profits in which labor would 
demand its rightful share, union organizational drives and pressure 
for increased production.  "The industries concerned most directly 
with national defense were almost entirely non-union in 1917.  Now 
they are 30 to 40 percent unionized, with aggressive organizing 
1 
campaigns under way or projected in most fields."  The validity of 
Reynolds' theory, in relationship to the steel industry and more 
specifically to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation soon proved itself 
correct. 
*Labor Pressure Rising," Time, 37, March 3, 1941, 
P. 17. 
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Trouble first erupted at Bethlehem's Lackawanna plant 
near Buffalo, New Yorl- .  Or rebruary 28, 1941, Spec's leaders 
called a strike there.  The company had refused the union s re- 
peated attempts to hold negotiations to discuss labor's grievances. 
The workers' major complaint centered around the wage issue.  The 
1940 earnings report of the five largest United States steel pro- 
ducers showed overwhelming evidence that steel's production and 
2 
profits were booming.   Bethlehem Steel, the nation's number tvo 
producer, benefiting from defense contracts, had tremendous nrofits 
in 1940; they set an all-time record with earnings of $48,677,524 
and during the first week of February, 1941, operated at one-hundred 
3 
per cent capacity. 
Bethlehem's labor problem began when no substantial wage 
increase followed the company's increased profits.  SWOC demanded 
wage hikes, but Bethlehem only answered by suspending one-thousand 
of its employees, many of them active unionists.  Therefore, SWOC 
called for a walk-out and, "... in freezing weather, Polish, 
Negro and native born steelworkers angrily marched in a picket line, 
on strike.  Inside, one by one, open hearth furnaces shut down, 
4 
nroduction dwindled, came almost to a standstill." 
Later, SWOC presented the company with their demands for 
9 
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settling the dispute and terminatin? the strike.  The list included 
the reinstatement of workers fired over the wage disagreement and 
an immediate conference between the union and Bethlehem's raanffement 
to discuss grievances.  Moreover, the union demanded an f'LRE con- 
ducted election at the plant to determine an exclusive bargaining 
agent along with a promise from the company that it would bargain. 
The strike ended onlv thirty-nine hours after it started 
when the companv finally agreed to the union's first two demands. 
"At the Lackawanna plant, workers accented the terms with a whoop, 
convinced that the settlement was a triunnh for S.^.O.C."   As 
steel began to roll again, Bittner released a statement to the 
press:  "This is. . . the first time on a large scale that our 
6 
union has been able to get any sort of agreement from Rethlehem." 
Response to the strike proved more favorable than even 
SWOC's leaders anticipated.  Otherwise, if the strike was not at 
all impressive, Bethlehem would have never signed a truce, "... 
for this would have been the time to settle 'the C.I.O. problem' 
once and forever.  Instead, the strike proved the reverse:  that 
the corporation which has held out more fiercely than any other 
7 
steel plant was vulnerable."  However, most everyone involved 
realized that Bethlehem had not surrendered; but no one disagreed 
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At that time, March, 1.941, an article in Life magazine 
discussed the validity of the Lackawanna strike and the particularly 
dangerous and sensitive time in which it occurred.  The article 
concluded that the nation could not afford stoppages in defense 
production, especially at a company like Bethlehem Steel which 
had $1,500,000 in defense contracts and produced a lartte amount of 
heavy ordanance and armor plate steel.  But the article also pointed 
out that, "... Lahor can not be expected to stand bv meeklv 
while industry is booming, while profits and prices are rising, and 
particularly while companies like Bethlehem and Ford remain stubborn 
8 
resisters to unionism and national labor laws."  Although the 
country needed continued steel production unhampered by labor strife 
and struggles, many understood and empathized with labor's position 
and recognized the need for peaceful negotiations to achieve the 
desired outcome.  But the stubborn resistance of many steel makers, 
with Bethlehem Steel at the top of the list, threatened to produce 
an uneasy and very much unwanted situation on the labor front. 
Even though Bethlehem had "just experienced a walk-out at 
its Lackawanna plant which could have proved disastrous, and in the 
end was forced to concede to two of the union's demands, the company 
continued to follow its staunch anti-union policies; an action that 
only served to anger and irritate SW0C's leaders and many of 
Bethlehem's emplovees. 
8 
"Bethlehem Steel Strike," Life, 10, March 10, 1941, 
P. 34. 
118 
This time, trouble erupted at the main plant in Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania.  The company, over the years, had disregarded an ::L,-M 
order, of August, 19 39, to disband its ERP and to end it* long- 
standing opposition to SV70C' s organizing campaign.  Instead, 
Bethlehem appealed the Board's decision to a higher court.  Tn 
March, 1941, before the appeal had been settled, the compan-' orenared 
itself to hold elections of ERP representatives on company property. 
A statement made by an ERP representative, regarding the election, 
read:  "We are simply exercising the rights and privileges of free 
9 
American workmen.' 
The ERP claimed to stand "one-hundred per cent" behind the 
defense program and against anything interfering with it, including 
labor strikes.  Moreover, they maintained that the holding of an 
election was legal since the courts had not as yet upheld the NLR3 
findings.  Thus, Bethlehem's management and its company union 
maintained they had the right to carry out the election process as 
planned. 
SWOC adamantly disapproved of Bethlehem's planned election 
activities and perceived it as an egregious disregard of federal 
law.  The steel union responded bv threatening a strike if the 
elections proceeded as proposed.  "As soon as our men see the ballot 
boxes," said Howard T. Curtiss, Bethlehem's local SWOC director, 
"thev will stop work and strike.  Thev are more determined thar. ever 
0 
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10 
to walV out as the zero hour approaches."   SWOC backed up their 
strike threat by claiming a majority of the 24,000 men employed in 
the mills; even though that contradicted Bethlehem's contention 
that its company union controlled the support of all but four 
11 
or five thousand workers.    Clarke App.lebv, SWOC' s regional director 
in charge of the union drive to organize Bethlehem's plants, de- 
clared that, "... any attempt to hold the election would con- 
stitute an 'illegal election' because the National Labor Relations 
Board had termed the E.R.P. a company union and ordered it to 
12 
disband." 
SWOC, following their usual strategy of infiltrating 
the company unions of the corporations they attempted to organize, 
had been angered over an amendment passed by Bethlehem's ERP to 
discourage just such action.  The ERP's amendment provided that, 
"... membership in a rival labor organization was a bar to 
13 
election as a representative under the Plan."   In 1940, four 
employees, after receiving a majority vote as ERP representatives, 
were refused the position based on this new rule.  However, many 
pro-SWOC elements claimed they succeeded in gaining control of the 
company union regardless of all reports to the contrary. 
10 






The Bethlehem Clobe Times, 25 March 1941, p. 16. 
120 
A few of the retired steel workers commented on tMs 
narticular issue.  .Tohn Uadolr.ev recalled that workers who fnvrred 
a "true union," a CTn union, ran for office in the ERP elections 
and succeeded in gaining the posts; "... at meetings they'd 
14 
try to embarrass management."   Victor Henning mentioned similar 
occurrences and reported that after infiltrating the ERP, SWOC 
men succeeded in converting some ERP representatives into pro-CTO 
men.  Lewis Kozo even recalled one of the ERP's presidents be- 
15 
coming a "SWOC man." 
On Monday March 24, 1941, the annual election for ERP 
representatives at Bethlehem's main plant proceeded as promised 
by the company.  That same evening SWOC fulfilled their pledge by 
calling a walk-out.  "SWOC members began filtering out of the four 
and a half mile long plant shortly after the strike call was issued 
for 5:30 P.M. to back up an earlier threat by the CIO union that 
its members would walk out if they found the ERP election was in 
16 
progress." 
The strike continued for four days.  During that period 
the union publicly issued their demands.  This time they insisted 
that strikers return to their jobs without loss of seniority and 
that Bethlehem stop holding the ERP elections on company property 
immediatelv.  SWOC's demands also required that the company abide 
14 
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by the NLRB order to disband the ERP altogether.  Last, the union 
wanted Bethlehem to apree to enter negotiations regarding a Labor 
Board election throughout the nlant for selection of a collective 
17 
bargainine agent. 
The 1941 strike at Bethlehem's main plant brought bach 
many memories to all those interviewed (pro-unionists, anti- 
unionists and those that remained indifferent) regardless of the 
role they specifically played in the event.  With a majority of the 
work force on strike and four days of turmoil, bitterness and 
violence, it was inpossible for all those involved to avoid taking 
sides one way or the other.  They all felt the effects of the 
on-going organizing process.  Forced tn make some sort o^ decision 
concerning their activities during those four days, some chose to 
walk-out in sunnort of the union's cause, some chose to be strike- 
breakers in defiance of SWOC's actions, while still others chose to 
stay away from the plant entirely.  This later group did so for 
various reasons; they either refused to get actively involved or 
happened to be locked-out of the T.lant because of circumstances 
created by the strike itself. 
Practically all the men interviewed recalled the bitter- 
ness, frustration and violence that occurred during those four 
days in March.  The Governor ordered all bars in the strike area 
17 
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closed as strikers and pickets maintained a constant vigil around 
the olant.  The men inarched and carr-ied signs that denounced the 
ERP and called for its demise; others carried placards calling 
for NLRB conducted elections to decide on an exclusive bargaining 
agent. 
Inside the plant, strikebreakers contributed to whatever 
work could be accomplished under such irregular conditions.  For 
those that remained in the olant, the companv provided as best it 
could certain necessary comforts.  The workers were supplied with 
food to eat and cots to sleep on.  Ironically, violence first 
erupted at 11:00 P.M. on March 24, when strikers demolished a 
vending machine, used by the company to carry food into the olant 
for the strikebreakers. 
However, throughout most of the strike, violence and 
destruction were evident all over.  The smell of tear gas lingered 
in the air and mounted police roamed the streets while others 
continuallv stood guard at the plant's entrance gates.  The 
surrounding area was scattered with overturned or demolished 
automobiles and shattered glass lav everywhere. 
On March 25, the violence was particularly notable when 
mounted police charged out of the plant's main gate in order to 
break up the pickets and scatter their forces.  One local newspaper 
described the incident most graphically: 
Riding high on nrancinfr horses and swinging 
skull-cracking riot sticks. . . . Their 
123 
appearance, "like an avenglne horde spewed 
unexpectedly from the suddenl" opened main 
gate, caused consternation anon? the tickets and 
spectators who in a fev minutes were retreatinr 
in hysterical disorder for fear of being 
trampled on bv the horses or being inlured by 
the large clubs.  IS 
A   notable amount of violence ensued and injuries mounted on both 
sides—police and strikers, not to mention innocent bvstanders. 
Bittner claimed that the police "provoked violence" when they tried 
to break un the picket lines and disperse the crowd.  Bittner also 
blamed Bethlehem for the strike because thev knowingly violated the 
19 
law. 
Many of the nro-union people that participated as strikers 
and pickets in ^arch, 1941, revepled an intense dislike and even 
hatred for strikebreakers or, as they called them, scabs.  They re- 
sented tremendouslv that union men put their life and career on the 
line for the entire work force at Bethlehem.  However, strikebreakers 
continued to get paid, remained in the company's pood eraces, and if 
the strike succeeded, would gain the exact same benefits resulting 
from union recognition as the strikers would. 
Oven McFadden commented about his attitudes toward strike- 
breakers; " . . ,'til this day I can still nick out the scabs.  Scabs 
took this name with them to their graves.  They couldn't live it down 
18 
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20 
even though we didn't rub it in."   Mc^adden, alonr with many of 
his fellow workers, despised even more the men that sinned union 
cards and joined SWOC but still participated as strikebreakers 
during the walk-out.  McFadden recalled that nro-union men would 
get so frustrated that they would throw paint on the homes of 
noted strikebreakers. He then stated, however, that:  ". . . maybe 
we should have taken it out on the employees instead of their 
21 
homes." 
Nicholas Kiak recalled that both his brother and his 
best friend were strikebreakers and remained locked in the plant 
throughout the strike's entirety; he then talked about the tensions 
22 
caused by the ill feelings and bitterness.    Another man, George 
Dancho, remained indifferent to the on-going organizing campaign, 
refused to participate in the strike in any capacity, and even left 
toxm  durin? the course of the strike.  Dancho explained his feelings 
at the time:  "I was afraid of reprisals.  I didn't want to be called 
23 
a scab."   The frustration and bitterness felt by most of 
Bethlehem's work force during the March strike, seemed evident by 
statements such as these. 
The strike ended on March 28, 1941, after an all-nipht 
20 
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conference between Federal and State mediators, union leaders and 
nanapmetit officials.  The terms of the agreement stipulated that 
strikers could return to worl without a loss of seniority, that 
the company would continue to meet and deal with representatives 
of its employees in collective bar^ainino, and all dealings would 
be without discrimination.  Moreover, the company would deal with 
SWOC as the collective bargaining agency for its members, and it 
would accord SWOC erual privileges and opportunities including a 
mutuallv accepted manner of handling grievances.  However, future 
action with reference to the selection of an exclusive bargaining 
agency would await final disposition of the case pending in the 
'24 
Court. 
In the end, SWOC claimed a major victory even though 
they only succeeded in achieving one of their strike demands in 
entirety; the other three stipulations being company inspired 
during the negotiations.  But most important, a maior obstacle 
to SWOC's campaign reversed itself as a result of this new agree- 
ment.  The steel union finally obtained a written settlement from 
the largest and most powerful member of the traditionally anti- 
union Little Steel group—the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.  As one 
SWOC man reportedlv stated, "We consider this the same as a written, 
25 
signed agreement with the Bethlehem Steel Company." 
9/ 




SWOC called a victorv narade to celebrate the favorable 
outcome of the strike.  John Wadolney recalled that, "... when 
the strike was called there were onlv one-hundred and sixty-five 
naid up members.  We weren't very confident.  Rut bv the narade 
26 
there were 10,000."   R.A. Lewis, General Manager of the main 
plant, expressed a sense of relief that the strike ended rather 
quicklv.  "The efforts that were made successfully to restore and 
maintain order so that the men could po to and from work were an 
important contributing factor in the reaching of an early ad-just- 
27 
ment." 
Later, in 1941, NLRB conducted elections revealed a 
majority of employee support for SWOC.  The largest adverse vote 
was at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  At the main nlant, 5,095 voting 
steel workers favored an independent union to 11,535 for the 
28 
SWOC. 
As SWOC expected, the success of this phase of their 
organizing drive, aimed at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, spread 
to the remaining unorganized Little Steel companies.  The steel 
workers employed at these1 firms revealed through NLRB directed 
elections their strong desire for an independent industrial union 
represented by SWOC.  Therefore, the Steel Workers Organizing 
26 
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Committee was entitled under re<ler.nl law to become the oxclusivr 
collective bargaining apcnt at the remaining non-union American 
steel conorations. 
In September, 1941, the Little Steel companies reversed 
their traditional nolicv of anti-unionism, recognized SWOC and hecan 
the process of collective bargaining with the steel union.  I'ovever, 
negotiations were long and drawn out.  On April 1h, 1942, a settle- 
ment was finallv reached between the management of these firms and 
the union.  The agreement gave the nation's steel workers a wage in- 
crease of ten cents ner hour, more liberal vacations, extra pay for 
holiday work and additional subsidiarv benefits. 
However, before the steel settlement was finalized, the 
United States entered the war.  In order to maintain uninterrupted 
steel production, ^resident Roosevelt, on Januar-/ 12, 1942, esta- 
blished the National War Labor Board (WLB).  The WLB was empowered 
to set wages, hours, and union conditions and through the war powers 
of the President it could enforce these in a final extremitv by 
government seizure and operation of plants.  The WLB defended labor's 
rights under the Wagner Act. 
The Board arrived at a compromise on the union sho^ 
ouestion which created considerable hostilitv between management 
and labor.  It was known as the "maintenance of membership" clause. 
This clause stipulated that non-union members hired into a war plant 
were not required to join the union as a condition of emplovment, 
but members had to remain in it.  Moreover, the union remained the 
128 
collective bargaining agent for the duration of the contract. 
In addition, on July 16, 1942, the Board resnonded to 
the rise in the cost of living durin" that year with the so-called 
Little Steel formula.  Under the Formula, steel workers across the 
nation obtained a 5 1/2 cents ner hour waoe increase; "... the 
figure being based unon a decline in their real hourly wages since 
January 1, 1941 olus certain other equities arising out of the 
29 
requirements of the national anti-inflationarv prop-ram." 
In summary, the. National Labor Relations Board, in 1941, 
certified SWOC as the collective bargaining agent for emnloyees of 
four of the Little Steel corporations:  Bethlehem Steel, Republic 
Steel, Inland Steel, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube.  And by August, 
1942, the four independent steel producers had signed contracts 
with SWOC.  Finally, in Sentember, 1942, United States Steel 
changed their contract and granted SWOC exclusive bargaining rights, 
maintenance of membership and the check-off. 
Thus, SWOC had completed their major task—the successful 
unionization of the entire American steel industry.  In 1942, the 
CIO dissolved the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and replaced 
it with the United Steel Workers of America.  Frank: Staffieri, who 
remained neutral during the entire organizing drive at Bethlehem 





pood union.  Thev tal-e good care of vou." 
Manv of the nen emploved at. Bethlehem vividly recalled 
the fight for union recognition between 1936 and 1941, regardless 
of the role thev played in the event.  Those that active!v 
participated in the organizing drive expressed a sense of nride 
and satisfaction in what they helped accomplish.  But for all 
those emnloyed by the nation's steel producers, regardless of 
their attitudes toward unionism, the ultimate achievement of the 
goals and ob-jectives inherent in the idea of unionism, over the 
years, drastically changed the terms and conditions of their employ- 
ment.  Moreover, unionization ungraded th<= economic circumstances 
and changed the personal living standards of industrial steel 
workers.  Herbert Sechler vividly described what union recognition 
eventually meant to himself and his fellow workers: ". . . it was 
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the same as the sun coming ut>." 
All of the retired Bethlehem workers, including the 
staunchly anti-union elements, recognized and accepted willingly 
the benefits acnuired by union recognition.  When asked to noint 
out specific advantages resulting from unionization, almost all 
of the men involved mentioned similar benefits.  They included in 
their list such accomplishments as:  better and safer working con- 
ditions, wages and hours; an improved, more, efficient, system of 
30 Frank Staffieri, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, personal inter- 
view with Steven W. Bates, 19 Mav 1975. 
31 
Interview with Herbert Sechler. 
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handling grievances; unemployment compensation; health and death 
benefits; nay for holidays; paid vacations; hipher pension nlans 
and finallv, -job security and protection.  As one man put it, 
32 
" . . . the union ?ot the workinp-man a niece of the pie." 
32 
Interview with George Dancho, 
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Conclusion 
The Steel Workers Organizing Committee, under the direction 
of the CIO, successfully completed their main objectives, the organi- 
zation of the nation's steel workers around an independent industrial 
union, the United Steel Workers of America.  Their organizing drive 
took them less than ten years to complete and they virtually brought 
an end to the long-standinp oolicies of anti-unionisn and the open 
shop; policies which the nation's steel producers had self-righteouslv 
employed over the vears. 
SWOC gained for themselves and the thousands of workers 
they represented, recognition of an independent steel union, ex- 
clusive bareaining rights at the corporations involved and the 
benefits and advantages inherent in the idea of unionism itself. 
These benefits included health insurance, paid vacations and holidays, 
higher pensions, and supplemental unemployment benefits.  Moreover, 
the American steel worker gained security and protection through 
seniority rights and a more comprehensive and effective grievance 
system.  Eventually, labor in general, ascended to the position of 
respectability among the forces of power and influence in American 
society. 
Labor's struggle for this power and respectability had 
always been a difficult and many times violent and bloody one in the 
course of American history; the orsanization of the steel industry 
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war, no exception.  However, the historical circumstances surrounding 
the decade of the 1930's created a rine atmosphere for labor to de- 
mand its equal share of rights and privileges in American society. 
This time labor had an important ally in the federal eovernnent; for 
the first time in American history the government projected a 
favorable national labor policy.  The pro-labor stance of Roosevelt's 
New Deal and the legislation enacted by it, specifically the N1PA 
and the Warner Act, aided labor's cause significantly.  Rasical.lv, 
those Acts legitimized and made a matter of public policy labor's 
right to collective bargaining.  Thus, labor pained a legal basis of 
support to forge ahead in the process of unionizing the nation's mass 
production industries, and in particular, the steel industrv. 
Over and over again, the steel union, during their or- 
ganizing drive, consistently took advantage of the MLR.B and its 
pro-labor sympathies.  VTbenever negotiations, strikes and all other 
means failed, SWOC relied on court action taken against specific steel 
manufacturers to bring about their desired results.  Finally, through 
NLPJ3 directed elections, SWOC made a convincing argument toward the 
attainment of their goals of union recognition and exclusive bar- 
gaining rights; at the companies involved, the steel union gained a 
majority of employee support and votes specifically regarding those 
expressed issues. 
The cordial atmosphere, created by the pro-labor posture 
of the federal government and the formation of the CTO, forced a 
majority of the nation's steel workers to reevaluate their attitudes 
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avA   onlnion? and to stand bv those convection? rec^rdln? tv,e union 
question.  This kind nf   activitv, in many instarco.s, determined the 
future role each individual worker would nlay in the union drive 
for recognition.  Many non tool: a more positive stand in order to 
change the terms and conditions of their employment, joined S'.-'OC' s 
ranks and became active union oreanizers. 
As evidenced by the study on Bethlehem Steel specifically, 
the wen that felt compelled to become active unionists did 30 for 
very definite reasons.  Generally, these men experienced greater 
nressure and more demands placed on them bv their jobs and their 
bosses than many of their fellow workers did.  The pro-union peonle 
involved, encountered abusive and degrading treatment from their 
foremen and feared losing their jobs on a day-to-day basis.  This 
kind of behavior only forced them to seek external means in order 
to gain the security and protection they needed and demanded. 
Basically, the pro-unionists blamed the company and its policies for 
forcing them into the pro-union camp and active unionist roles. 
For men such as these, the union represented a positive 
force, a way out of their dilemma.  Through collective action and 
group identification, the union gave them the strength and con- 
fidence they needed to continue working in a hostile environment. 
Bv fight^no for a cause they believed in and trusting that their 
objectives would eventually be achieved, many steel workers regained 
self-confidence and were able to meet the challenges of their jobs. 
13A 
The workmen that maintained anti-unionist positions 
throughout SUOC's organizing campaign at Bethlehem Steel ex- 
perienced a much different set of circumstances in repard to 
the atmosphere in which they worked.  For the most oart, the anti- 
union people interviewed claimed to have a relatively pood re- 
lationship with their hosses and the coirmany itself.  Moreover, 
this Rroun verv rarely mentioned encountering ahusive or degrading 
treatment from their foremen.  In addition, most of them managed 
to attain a reasonable amount of autonomy in their jobs, some- 
times even allowing for a certain sense of creativity and ingenuity 
in their work.  Because of these particular circumstances, these 
men did not fear losing their jobs on a day-to-day basis as the pro- 
unionists did.  Thus, their -jobs afforded them the security and pro- 
tection that pro-union men claimed to lack; and the anti-unionists 
believed that their jobs would only he in jeopardy if they did 
something to irritate and anger the company, such as joining the 
union.  Therefore, even though these men lacked specific benefits 
and worked under bad conditions with low pay, they did not feel 
an immediate compulsion caused by real pressures and tensions to 
change their condition or to join the fight for union recognition. 
Ironically, the anti-unionists involved did not object 
to the union's ideals and the benefits and advantages that would 
result from union recognition.  But these men chose anti-unionist 
roles rather than remain neutral or indifferent to the union question; 
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they claimed to tale this position because they staunchly dis- 
approved of the tactics employed bv union men to pain their 
objectives.  The tactics mentioned most often included stril-.es, 
demonstrations, violence and intimidation.  Thus, a hostile 
working environment existed between the pro-union and anti-union 
steel workers at Bethlehem. 
The majority of Bethlehem's work force, along x'ith other 
workers like themselves located in the nation's steel centers, 
felt the effects of the on-going process of SWOC's organizing cam- 
paign from 1936-1941. Sometime during that period, they all faced 
the problem of making a decision, one way or another, in regard to 
their individual role in the union's fight. 
As their jobs varied, so did the departments in which 
they worked, the ethnic and religious composition of their fellow 
employees, the personalities of their foremen and their attitudes 
toward work in general.  All of these factors influenced the mens' 
daily on the job experiences and thus, helped shape their attitudes 
and opinions toward unionism. 
However, those that finally joined SWOC and became active 
unionists directly participated in the events that eventual.lv 
changed the entire course of American labor history.  Moreover, 
they gained for themselves and others like them the benefits and 
advantages inherent in the idea of unionism.  The effects of their 
successful efforts, are still experienced or encountered today in 
almost every facet of American life.  Although labor still fights 
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for more benefits and increased wapes, the present generation of 
steel workers face a totallv different set of circumstances than 
their forebearers did.  These pioneers of unionism changed the 
lot of the American worker and established an imnortant ->lace for 
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